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NOTES
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E) AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: CLOSING THE
WINDOW OF ADMISSIBILITY FOR
COCONSPIRATOR HEARSAY
INTRODUCTION

The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment' embodies an ancient 2 and lofty3 principle that every criminal defendant has the right to
confront his accusers. 4 The right of confrontation helps guarantee the
criminal defendant that only reliable evidence will be admitted against
him at trial5 by ensuring that accusations are made under oath,6 by a
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id.
2. Commentators have noted that the confrontation right derives from the framers'
reaction to the prosecutorial abuses that occurred during the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh
in 1603. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
104 (1969); see also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 100 n.4 (1972) (adhering to the
theory because of its quality as a "highly romantic myth"). Sir Walter had the misfortune of being convicted of treason solely on the hearsay evidence of an alleged coconspirator, despite the unreliability of a "saying of some wild Jesuit," Graham, supra, at
101, and despite his repeated demands to confront his accusers, Graham, supra, at 100.
An even more ancient reference to the right to confrontation acknowledges the Roman
practice of providing the accused an opportunity to confront his accusers. See Acts 25:16
(King James) ("It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that
he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for
himself.").
3. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (confrontation right is one
of the fundamental guarantees encompassed within the right to a trial by jury); Graham,
supra note 2, at 132-33 (noting the "strong element of folk justice, gut fairness, [and]
adversary sportsmanship involved in the confrontation notion. . . . [t]he idea that one
who accuses another of wrong ought to do so in a forum where he assumes the consequences of his statement has. . .power. . . as an important symbol of fairness").
4. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("literal right to 'confront' the
witness at the time of trial. . . forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause"). The object of the clause as originally conceived was to prevent the use of
ex parte affidavits against the accused, and to provide the defendant with opportunities
for "testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, [and for] compelling
[the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor. . . whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 158 (quoting Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
The confrontation clause also serves to ensure the reliability of convictions, see infra
note 5, control prosecutorial misconduct, Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee
note; see Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale LJ. 1434, 1438-39
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Confrontation], and give the defendant "the psychological
satisfaction of observing the evidence relie[d] upon to condemn him," Graham, supra
note 2, at 105.
5. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); McCormick on Evidence § 252, at 752 (1.Cleary 3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as McCormick]; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980)

1291

1292

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

declarant whose demeanor and credibility can be assessed by the trier of
fact,' when the witness is subject to cross-examination. 8 The framers
(presence of the accuser.at trial "makes it more difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person is an accused and present at trial") (quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 1 800[01], at 800-10 (1979)); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (clause
provides "certainty in. . . conducting criminal trials" by permitting only reliable hearsay to come before the trier of fact). See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. The
Court has long recognized that "[a]n important element of a fair trial is that the jury
consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968); see, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 66; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970); Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
6. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note; cf Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945) (rights may not
be deprived nor convictions based on statements not made under fear of perjury penalties). The value of the oath, aside from any religious significance, is that it impresses
upon the witness "the seriousness of the matter," Green, 399 U.S. at 158, by the imposition of penalties for peijury, see id. See infra note 143 and accompanying text for a
discussion whether the oath by itself can be an adequate guarantor of reliability.
7. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)); see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
8. Cross-examination helps ensure that only reliable evidence will be admitted because it gives the defendant an opportunity to test the sincerity and recollection of the
witness and to clarify ambiguities in the witness' testimony. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) (tests sincerity); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19
(1965) (tests sincerity and recollection) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1895)); Dowdell v United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (tests recollection);
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (tests ambiguities in testimony); Mattox,
156 U.S. at 242-43 (tests sincerity and recollection). The right to cross-examination is
considered the core protection secured by the confrontation clause. See, e.g., Roberts, 448
U.S. at 63 (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418 (1965)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157-58 (1970); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418; Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 330; Mattox, 156 U.S. at
242-43; cf Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in
CriminalProsecutions: A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1390 (1972) ("Absent sufficient inherent assurances of reliability, the only permissible guarantor of the
hearsay declaration's evidentiary value is the defendant's cross-examination of the declarant.").
Effective cross-examination at trial will ensure a defendant of his confrontation right.
See Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (when hearsay declarant admits making the prior statement
and testifies at trial subject to adequate cross-examination, the "out-of-court statement
for all practical purposes regains most of the lost [confrontation] protections"); cf. Fed,
R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note (cross-examination is effective means of removing testimonial infirmities). Professor Wigmore suggested that the constitutional
guarantee is simply a "right to the opportunity of cross-examination." 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 1365, at 28 (. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore],
Confrontation is arguably a more demanding protection, however, than a simple right to
cross-examination. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (Court finds that "the
right of cross-examination is included in the right . . . to confront the witness"); cf
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (Court, by distinguishing between the
rights of cross-examination and confrontation, implies that cross-examination is only a
component of the confrontation protection). The Court has nevertheless implied on a
number of occasions that if the declarant is adequately cross-examined at trial, no confrontation problem will arise. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 164, 168 (confrontation clause
does not require exclusion of prior inconsistent statement when the declarant concedes
making the statement and can be cross-examined); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
136 (1968) (unreliable evidence is a threat to defendant's confrontation right unless wit-
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considered this safeguard to be essential to fair criminal proceedings and
therefore a fundamental guarantee of life and liberty.9
The rule against hearsay evidence 10 also recognizes that statements
that are not made under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact and
subject to cross-examination, are generally unreliable." Exceptions to
this rule,12 however, permit certain accusations to be introduced into evidence without affording the defendant the opportunity to confront his
accusers, 13 because these statements possess guarantees of reliability generally not present in out-of-court statements.'" Although these exceptions appear to deny the defendant his right of confrontation,"5 the
confrontation clause has never been interpreted as a wholesale exclusion
of hearsay evidence. 6 Instead, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
ness can be cross-examined); Pointer,380 U.S. at 404 (confrontation and cross-examination used almost interchangeably in discussing fair trial guarantees).
9. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-76 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring); F.
Heller, supra note 2, at 107. The collection of criminal defendant rights that appear in
the sixth amendment respond to a number of common law deficiencies in protecting the
accused and assuring a fair trial. See Green, 399 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., concurring);
Confrontation, supra note 4, at 1436 n.10. Prior to the evolution of adversarial requirements in the seventeenth century, a defendant was able to defend against accusations only
by showing that the prosecution had not adequately proved its case. See Green, 399 U.S.
at 176 (Harlan, J., concurring). No assistance of counsel, compulsory process, notice of
charges, or confrontation of adverse witnesses was mandatory in a criminal proceeding.
See id. at 176 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring). Recognizing the need for these important
aspects of a defense, the framers responded with the sixth amendment "package of
rights" for criminal defendants. -Id. at 176. The Court's use of the confrontation standard shows that it is imposing a stricter measure of reliability on admissible hearsay than
due process requires. See infra note 113.
10. Fed. R_ Evid. 802 provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
11. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 5, § 245, at 726-27; Wigmore, supra note 8,
§ 1362, at 3, 7; Morgan, HearsayDangersand the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
Harv. L. Rev. 177, 183-84 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan I]. The advisory committee commented that the oath alone is not sufficient to eliminate hearsay deficiencies, and
is less compelling than cross-examination as a device to assure reliability. Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1) advisory committee note.
12. See Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 for the current statutory embodiment
of the hearsay exceptions, many of which were recognized at common law in similar
forms.
13. Availability of the declarant is immaterial to the admission of hearsay under Rule
803 exceptions, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(l)-(24), although unavailability is a condition of
hearsay admissibility under Rule 804 exceptions, see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)-(5). See
infra note 90 for a definition of unavailability under Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).
14. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980) ("hearsay exceptions" rest on "solid foundations" of reliability).
15. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminalprosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const.
amend. VI (emphasis added). Thus, in a criminal case, any hearsay admitted under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in the Federal Rules of Evidence violates a literal
reading of the confrontation clause when the declarant is not produced.
16. See, eg., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
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that the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule with its exceptions are

both "designed to protect [the] similar [value]"'

7

of assuring that only

reliable evidence will be admitted against a criminal defendant."8 The
two provisions do not, however, represent congruent principles.' 9 In
most cases, the confrontation clause affords a criminal defendant greater
protection than the hearsay rule was intended to offer .2z Even so, some
80 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 407 (1965); Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note; see also United States v.
Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980) ("As the Supreme Court recently explained, the confrontation clause establishes a rule of necessity.").
17. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980) (confrontation clause and hearsay rule protect similar values) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (confrontation clause and hearsay rule "stem from the same roots"); United States v.
Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1366 (9th Cir. 1980) ("hearsay rules and Confrontation Clause
may protect similar values").
18. The Supreme Court has found that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such
solid foundations [of reliability] that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (dying declarations and prior testimony) (quoting Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (business and public
records) (quoting Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related

Problems, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1970)); see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16
(1972) (prior cross-examined testimony); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)
(preliminary hearing testimony); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dying declarations and prior testimony); see also Martin, Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Rule,

188 N.Y.L.J. 1, July 9, 1982, at 26, col. 1 ("Specifically, those [similar] values are related
to the reliability of the trial process, promoted either by cross-examination in the presence of the fact finder or by some acceptable substitute.").
19. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (the Court's confrontation decisions
"have never established such a congruence"); see Martin, supra note 18, at 26, col. I ("the
similarity of underlying purposes does not necessarily establish a congruence"); cf Graham, supra note 2, at 103 (confrontation clause "describes a concept; it does not prescribe
a set of rules").
20. United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1366 (9th Cir. 1980); see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 158 (1970);
Confrontation, supra note 4, at 1437 ("[N]o hearsay rule closely approximates the advantages of confrontation; and no rule accurately distinguishes between reliable and unreliable evidence."). For example, even if the statement satisfies the particular exception
under which it is sought to be admitted, the admission of the statement may violate the
confrontation clause when the declarant is unavailable. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; see id.
at 156 (hearsay may satisfy Rule 803 requirements, under which availability is immaterial, but the prosecution must still demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant-the
impossibility or remote utility of production-before the admission of the statement
would satisfy the confrontation clause); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)
(exclusion of prior recorded testimony that qualified under the hearsay exception when
prosecution had not made good faith efforts to produce witness); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 722-26 (1968) (same); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900) (same). As
promulgated in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the exceptions are not cast in positive
terms of admissibility, but rather in terms recognizing that they may still fail to satisfy
confrontation principles. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, the confrontation
clause proved to be less protective than the corresponding hearsay exception as subsequently enacted. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79, 88 (1970) (admission of coconspirator statement that would not have qualified under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)); Green, 399
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exceptions to the hearsay rule have been found sufficiently reliable to al-

low admission of hearsay evidence without violating the defendant's right
of confrontation."

When the Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules) were promulgated in 1975,1 most of the traditional common law exceptions to the
hearsay rule were codified as "hearsay exceptions."'
The admissions
exception, however, was classified as "not hearsay"' 4 on an adversary

theory of admissibility25 that makes a party's own voluntary statements

admissible against him, even though they do not generally contain the

same guarantees of reliability' as the statements deemed to be "hearsay
exceptions." 2 6 This theory rarely causes confrontation problems when

the defendant's direct admissions are admitted into evidence because the
defendant can usually take the stand and "confront" his own statements,

either by explanation or denial." Moreover, direct admissions are generally reliable: One does not normally make admissions that are false.2,
U.S. at 165 (admission of preliminary hearing testimony that would not have qualified
under Rule 804(b)(1) as former testimony).
21. See, eg., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980) (dying declarations, prior
testimony, business and public records) (dictum); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407
(1965) (dying declarations and prior testimony); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
107 (1934) (dying declarations and documentary evidence); Motes v. United States, 178
U.S. 458, 467-74 (1900) (former testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 24344 (1895) (prior testimony and dying declarations).
22. See Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1929 (1975) (codified as amended at Fed. R. Evid. 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
23. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note. The "hearsay exceptions" appear in Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(24) and in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)-(5).
24. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and
is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity or
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning
the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
This rule codifies the former admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
25. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note ("Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in
evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than the satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule."); see D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 28.13, at 366 (2d ed.
1983); McCormick, supra note 5, § 262, at 775; E. Morgan, Basic Problems of State and
Federal Evidence 241 (J. Weinstein 5th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Morgan II]; Lev,
The Law of Vicarious Admissions-An Estoppel, 26 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 17, 28-30 (1957).
26. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note ("No guarantee of
trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission.") with Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory
committee note (hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 are admissible on theory that
"under appropriate circumstances [they] may possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness").
27. See Morgan II, supra note 25, at 241 (a party "can hardly object that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine himself").
28. See Morgan II, supra note 25, at 241 (a party "can hardly object. . . that he is
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Statements made by authorized spokespersons or bona fide agents of a
defendant are also considered to be a defendant's admissions,2 9 with the
declarant's fiduciary duty to its principal creating a less obvious identity
of speakers under a true agency theory. Because such statements arise
more often in civil proceedings30 than in criminal proceedings, they seldom offend confrontation principles even when the agent is not produced.3 1 Furthermore, the fiduciary duty owed to the principal infuses a
reliability element into such statements because it requires an agent to
speak truthfully on his principal's behalf.32
33
When admissions are those of the accused's alleged coconspirators,
however, admitting the out-of-court statement is not justified by an identity of speakers, 34 a duty owed by a declarant to a defendant 35 that would
create a quasi-identity, or any reliability guarantee. 36 Instead, a fictional
unworthy of credence"); cf Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note ("persons
do not make statements that are damaging to themselves unless satisfied . . . that they
are true"); Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 159, 162 (1983) ("common sense" that "people will not make
a statement that damages their [penal] interests unless they believe the statements to be
true") [hereinafter cited as Inculpatory Statements].
29. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). For agents other
than authorized spokespersons, however, the statements must have been made within the
scope of the agency relationship. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); see, e.g., D. Binder, supra
note 25, § 28.13, at 366-67; Morgan II, supra note 25, at 247; Lev, supra note 25, at 4245.
30. See, e.g., Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufmann & Doty, Ltd. v. Newcomb Securities Co., 751 F.2d 1262, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867,
869 (11th Cir. 1985). For example, these exceptions might arise in civil proceedings
when a corporate employee's statement is sought to be admitted against a defendant corporate officer. Use of an employee's statement in a criminal antitrust, fraud or negligence
proceeding, however, could raise some confrontation inquiry.
31. The sixth amendment, which by its terms applies "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,"
U.S. Const. amend. VI, does not protect civil defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII
advisory committee note.
32. An agent's fiduciary duty requires that he act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters relating to the agency relationship. Henn, Agency, Partnership and Other
Unincorporated Business Enterprises 81 (1982). Agents may not act secretly or for the
benefit of adverse parties. Id.
33. Coconspirator statements are considered to be admissions. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E).
34. The concert of action element of conspiracies, see, e.g., Callanan v. United States,
364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 573-74 (1951); United
States v. Dawson, 576 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979),
does not effect any transubstantiation of identities among the members of the conspiracy.
Not even the weakest fictions that rationalize coconspirator admissions have analogized
to this extreme.
35. The criminal agency rationale traditionally used to support admission of coconspirator statements supposes that coconspirators authorize each other to speak on matters involving the furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives. E.g., Morgan II, supra note
25, at 249; Lev, supra note 25, at 40. Comment, The HearsayException for Co-conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 530, 538-39 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearsay
Exception]. No one has extended the criminal agency fiction, however, to encompass any
duty of loyalty among coconspirators.
36. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. The drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence did not accept the trustworthiness rationale for any admissions, see Fed. R.
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criminal agency theory37 is frequently used3" to justify Rule
801(d)(2)(E)'s admissibility of alleged coconspirator's statements made
"during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 39 A more canEvid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note, and many commentators agree that reliability is
the most unsatisfactory rationale for the coconspirator exception, see, e.g., Davenport,
supra note 8, at 1387-88; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the CoConspirators'Exception to the HearsayRule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1165 (1954); Mueller, The Federal CoconspiratorException: Action, Assertion and Hearsay, 12 Hofstra L.
Rev. 323, 362 (1984); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Admissibility of
Statements from an Uncharged Conspiracy that Does Not Underlie the Substantive
Charge, 52 Fordhamn L. Rev. 933, 940 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Uncharged Conspiracy].
Justice White views the status of codefendant statements as "intrinsically much less
reliable" than other forms of hearsay, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141-42
(1968) (Vhite, J., dissenting), and believes that codefendant hearsay has "traditionally
been viewed with special suspicion. . . .[d]ue to [a codefendant's] strong motivation to
implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself," id. at 141. He further states that
"codefendant's admissions cannot enter into the determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence because they are unreliable. . . .for they are not only hearsay but hearsay
which is doubly suspect." Id. at 142; see Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 523-24
(1910) (better practice to "caution juries against too much reliance upon the testimony of
accomplices"); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909) (evidence of confessed accomplice "ought to be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care
and caution"). Because "a joint venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this rule [801(d)(2)(E)] even though no conspiracy has been charged," Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) Notes of the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 26, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7073, Justice White's view
on the unreliability of codefendant statements arguably has equal application to coconspirator statements.
In an attempt to ensure some reliability, courts have added a requirement that there be
independent evidence of the conspiracy in order for the coconspirator statement to be
admitted; although helping to identify the existence of the conspiracy, this requirement
does little to ensure the reliability of the statement implicating the defendant in the conspiracy. See infra notes 202-03.
37. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note ("the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that
already established"); see United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 344 (1983); Levie, supra note 36, at 1165.
The Supreme Court's adoption of the coconspirator exception in United States v.
Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 470 (1827), may have given special vitality to the
agency rationale. The coconspirators in Gooding were involved in an actual agency relationship. See id.; Oakley, From Hearsay to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-Conspirator
Exception in California-Fact,Fiction, and a Novel Approach, 16 Santa Clara L Rev. 1,
14-15 (1975) ("Gooding involved a business venture which was every bit as commercial
as it was illicit, and which was.. . operated along conventional business lines."). This
"classic civil agency relationship," id. at 14, made adoption of the exception under the
agency rationale justifiable. If Gooding had been decided under the current Federal
Rules, the declarant's statement could have been admitted as "a statement by [an] agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship," Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), without raising the
specters of coconspirator hearsay admissibility.
38. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974); United States
v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 344 (1983); United
States v. Stipe, 517 F. Supp. 867, 868-69 (W.D. Okla.), affld, 653 F.2d 446 (10th Cir.
1981).
39. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). This Rule adopts the common law form of the cocon-
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did explanation for the coconspirator exception is that coconspirator
statements are necessary tools for prosecuting conspiracies,4 0 which are
inherently covert and therefore difficult to prove. 4' The pendency and

furtherance requirements were intended to limit the admissible class of

coconspirator statements,4 2 indicating the Supreme Court's disfavor of
"attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of
conspiracy prosecutions. 4 3 Trustworthiness problems with coconspirator statements, however, remain manifold. 44 When the coconspirator is available for cross-examination at trial, the declarant at least
has an opportunity to expose unreliable elements in the accuser's previous statements; the admission of the prior statements therefore does not
violate the defendant's confrontation rights.45 Serious constitutional
problems arise, however, when Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is used to admit accusations against the defendant when the declarant is not produced at
spirator exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d
126, 130 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1981); S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprintedin
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7073. When the exception was first adopted by
the Supreme Court, the statement was required to be "connected with acts in furtherance
of the [conspiracy]." United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 470 (1827).
40. See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979) (the exception is used
as a result of necessity when "proof would otherwise be very difficult and the evidence
largely circumstantial"); Davenport, supra note 8, at 1385 (noting the special need for
"lax rules of evidence in prosecutions for such a traditionally secret and inchoate crime");
Levie, supra note 36, at 1166 (existence of the exception answers the prosecutor's need to
prove conspiracies); HearsayException, supra note 35, at 540-41 (same); Uncharged Conspiracy, supra note 36, at 944 (same). Because the necessity rationale has nothing to do
with reliability, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 n. 16 (1970), its use is unsatisfactory because it might result in convictions based on unreliable evidence, id. ("[Tihe
[only] 'necessity' [that exists] . . . is the State's 'need' to introduce relevant evidence
....
"); id. at 201 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (" 'necessity' that justifies the admission of
pretrial statements is not the prosecution's need to convict, but the factfinder's need to be
presented with reliable evidence to aid its determination of guilt or innocence").
41. See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979); Davenport, supra note
8, at 1384-85.
42. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note (limitation on admissibility of coconspirator statements "is in the accepted pattern"); id. (advisory committee did
not wish to expand admissibility beyond already established parameters); Levie, supra
note 36, at 1167-68 (furtherance and pendency requirements intended to afford criminal
defendants some protection from unreliable coconspirator admissions). For a discussion
on whether the pendency and furtherance requirements in fact limit the class of coconspirator hearsay, see Davenport, supra note 8, at 1385-88 (concluding that the requirements neither add to reliability, nor are used to exclude much coconspirator hearsay);
Levie, supra note 36, at 1167 (requirements do not realistically guarantee much protection in the ways they are applied). Even prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, the
Court reasoned that coconspirator statements should be limited to a narrow field of admissibility. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963).
43. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957).
44. See supra note 36 and accompanying text, infra notes 126-29 and accompanying
text.
45. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). The Supreme Court has found that
a defendant's opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant at trial makes hearsay
admissible for confrontation purposes, whether the hearsay was a "casual, off-hand remark to a stranger, [or] carefully recorded testimony at a prior hearing." Id. at 168.
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trial.4 6
In their attempts to comply with the Supreme Court's guidance on the
admissibility of hearsay testimony by unproduced declarants, the circuit
courts have approached the admissibility of coconspirator statements
with "substantial confusion"" and from different vantage points, but
they have almost always permitted the introduction of the testimony. 8
This Note argues that the circuit courts, in routinely admitting this evidence, are misreading Supreme Court pronouncements, which permit
only reliable hearsay evidence to be admitted at trial.49 Because coconspirator admissions by unproduced declarants, unlike many "hearsay exceptions," can rarely be sufficiently reliable under any standards
enunciated by the Court for general hearsay admissibility satisfying the
confrontation clause, a coconspirator declarant must be produced at trial
in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement.5' In cases in which
obtaining the declarant's presence at trial is impossible, the hearsay
should still be excluded if it adds crucial weight to the prosecution's case,
or is devastatingly prejudicial to the defendant. 5
Part I of this Note reviews the standards developed by the Supreme
Court in the past two decades for determining the circumstances under
which the admission of hearsay evidence satisfies confrontation principles. Although announced in somewhat broad terms, the standards represent narrow principles that focus on the necessity of admitting hearsay
declarations and the reliability of the statements. They therefore require
both the production of the declarant whenever possible and the exclusion
of unreliable evidence. Part II surveys the application of the Supreme
Court's standards in cases involving coconspirator admissions and shows
that the courts, in admitting coconspirator statements, are either too
broadly applying those standards or finding excuses to avoid them altogether. Part III demonstrates the rationale for and feasibility of making
coconspirator statements admissible only when the declarant is produced
at trial, or when production is impossible and the evidence is not crucial
or devastating. Only then can Rule 801(d)(2)(E) be applied with constitutional adequacy, assuring the defendant of his fundamental protections
and providing the trier of fact with a reliable basis on which to determine
guilt or innocence.
I.

HEARSAY THAT DOES NOT AFFRONT THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT

There rarely was any tension between the admission of hearsay evi46. See infra Pts. II. & III.
47. Sanson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3559, 3560 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
48. See infra Pt. II.
49. See infra Pt. III.
50. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
51. Prejudicial evidence is evidence likely to influence a jury to convict a defendant
for improper reasons. See infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
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dence and the confrontation clause prior to the Supreme Court's extension of confrontation protections to state defendants in 1965.52 Since
that time, the Court has found some hearsay to violate the defendant's
confrontation right,5 3 and other hearsay to offer. satisfactory substitutions
for the guarantees of confrontation. 4 The recent evolution in confrontation theory has centered on the reliability of the proffered hearsay,5 5 and
challenges to sufficiently reliable hearsay have been
confrontation-based
56
rebuffed.

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutional
problems that arise when Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is used to admit coconspirator statements by unproduced declarants,5 7 it has laid out a fairly
workable set of general rules governing the constitutional admissibility of
hearsay, despite the absence of a witness to cross-examine.5 8 These rules,
which limit the use of statements made by unproduced declarants, require both that the use of hearsay evidence be necessary due to the de52. The Court extended the confrontation right to the states through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). In
Pointer, the Court found that the introduction of a preliminary hearing transcript of the
testimony of a subsequently unavailable principal witness, see id. at 401, violated the
defendant's confrontation right because the defendant had not been represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, and thus lost the confrontation guarantee of adequate
cross-examination of his accuser, id. at 403, 406.
53. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968) (use of codefendant's confession implicating defendant denied defendant his confrontation right when declarant was unavailable for cross-examination); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25
(1968) (use of a witness' preliminary hearing transcript violated a defendant's confrontation right when the state had not made a good faith effort to produce the declarant at
trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (using codefendant's confession against
accused, and denying defendant opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses held to be
confrontation violations-the latter, a "'constitutional error of the first magnitude' ")
(quoting respondent's brief); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965) (use of an
alleged accomplice's confession implicating the accused denied defendant his confrontation right when the declarant could not be cross-examined).
54. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980) (admission into evidence of
prior cross-examined testimony of a subsequently unavailable witness did not violate defendant's confrontation right); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (same); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165, 170 (1970) (admission into evidence of preliminary
hearing transcript containing testimony that was cross-examined did not violate a defendant's confrontation right when the declarant, due to memory failure, was unavailable at
trial).
55. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158, 161 (1970). See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 216 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 164 (1970).
57. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court considered the confrontation
issue in a case involving the admission of coconspirator hearsay under a state statute. See
id. at 78-79. That case, however, was decided in 1970, prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, and involved a state coconspirator exception of much
broader scope than Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See infra note 63.
58. See infra Pt. I.B.
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clarant's unavailability,5 9 and that the evidence be reliable.'
A.

The Dutton Legacy

Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 ' the
Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans62 considered the confrontation issue
in a case involving admission of coconspirator hearsay under a state statute more broadly drawn than Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 63 A plurality of four
justices' found that the admission of an unproduced 65 coconspirator's
post-custodial statement implicating the defendant 66 did not violate the
defendant's confrontation right.67 Not only was the Court unable to
reach more than a plurality consensus, but the meaning and application
of the decision have puzzled scholars ever since. 6' The plurality held that
59. See infra Pt. I.B. 1.
60. See infra Pt. I.B.2. As used to admit some forms of hearsay, the rules permit the
introduction of evidence because the hearsay offers a rational substitute for the confrontation guarantees. When coconspirator hearsay is examined, however, the missing keystone
of reliability often makes admission premised on a highly unstable construction of the
requirement, well capable of collapsing to the detriment of a defendant's fundamental
rights. See infra Pt. III.
61. The Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated on January 2, 1975. See Federal
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926 (1975) (codified as amended at Fed. R. Evid. 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
62. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
63. Compareid. at 83 & n.15 (Georgia coconspirator exception permits admission of
statements made during concealment phase of conspiracy, even though no conspiracy
charged) with Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and accompanying advisory committee note
(Rule 801(d)(2)(E) prohibits statements made after the conclusion of the conspiracy's
goals; statement must be "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy").
64. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 76 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
65. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It appears that the declarant in this case was
available to be called as a witness, but that for unspecified reasons, the prosecution did
not produce him. Id. at 102 n.4. The defense did not subpoena the declarant, believing
that he would assert his privilege against self-incrimination, which would have been detrimental to the defense. Id.
66. Id. at 77 ("If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't
be in this now.").
67. See id. at 88. For a discussion of the facts of Dutton, see infra note 75.
68. See, eg., Davenport, supra note 8, at 1382; Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1972); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1185 (1979); Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, a Peek Forward, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 32, 39-41 (1973); Note, Hearsay and the Confrontation Guaranty, 38 La. L. Rev. 858, 862 (1978).

Even for a plurality decision, Dutton was especially fragmented. Justice Stewart wrote
for the plurality, see Dutton, 400 U.S. at 76, in which two Justices joined with a separate
concurring opinion, id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Burger, CJ.), and one
Justice concurred only in the result, id. at 93 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's concurrence objected to the plurality's characterization of the coconspirator statement's admission, see id. at 87 (evidence was neither "'crucial' Inlor 'devastating' "), as
something other than harmless error, "if it was error at all," id. at 90. Justice Harlan's
concurrence emphasized that the question was more appropriately tested under the aegis
of due process than under confrontation principles. Id. at 96-97. Justice Marshall's dissent, finding a clear violation of the defendant's confrontation right, was the most unified
section of the whole opinion, with the four dissenters in full agreement. Id. at 100.
Besides it being unclear why the plurality made little inquiry into the testimony's relia-
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no confrontation violation occurred because the statement was neither
"crucial" nor "devastating" and was "of peripheral significance at

most." 69 It then formulated a series of factors to be applied against hearsay statements to determine whether admission would violate a defend-

ant's confrontation right. These factors, which focus on the reliability of
the hearsay evidence and presage the Court's later formulation of what
constitutes admissible hearsay, 7 ° instruct that no denial of confrontation

occurs when: 1) the statement contains no express assertions about past

facts; 7 2) the declarant's personal knowledge of the recited facts is established by independent evidence;7 2 3) the statement is not likely to have
been based on faulty perception; 73 and 4) the circumstances surrounding
the statement tend to show that the declarant had no motive to falsify the
content of the statement. 74 After stating these factors, however, the plurality did not conduct a substantial inquiry into the testimony's
reliability.
bility, see infra note 75, it is also unclear why the plurality overlooked the prosecution's
complete lack of effort to produce an apparently available declarant, see supra note 65,
especially after holding in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), that the prosecution has a
duty to make good faith efforts to produce available declarants at trial, id. at 724-25. The
plurality simply indicated that confrontation of the declarant under the facts presented
would have been of small use to the defendant. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. This aside
was later adopted by the Court as the "remote utility" exception to the prosecution's duty
to produce apparently available declarants. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 & n.7
(1980).
69. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87.
70. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (only hearsay marked with sufficient
"indicia of reliability" can be admitted without an available declarant.
71. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 89.
74. Id.
75. In Dutton, the declarant was lying on his bed in the prison hospital facing the
wall, Dutton, 400 U.S. at 91, and was alleged to have stated, "'If it hadn't been for that
dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now,'" id. at 77. The witness
who reported the statement was outside the declarant's closed door and claimed to have
spoken with the declarant "in a normal voice" through a window in the door, completely
covered by glass and heavy steel mesh. See id. at 91. Prison personnel testified that
talking through closed doors was not customary. See id.
The plurality found that the declarant's post-custodial statement was not an express
assertion about a past fact, id. at 88-a type of statement that is usually deemed unreliable; see Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) advisory committee note-and that the declarant's knowledge of the defendant's identity and role in the murder had been established by
independent evidence, see Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88. It found further that the possibility of
the statement being based on faulty perception was "remote in the extreme," id. at 89,
that the circumstances under which the statement was made implied that the declarant
was sincere, see id., and finally, that the statement was a spontaneous utterance and a
declaration against penal interest, id. Based on these factors, the plurality concluded that
the statement was reliable. See id.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out the shallowness of the plurality's search for
reliability. See id. at 103-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In reversing the conviction on
grounds of a violation of the defendant's confrontation right, the Court of Appeals had
concluded that there was considerable doubt whether the statement was reliable or in fact
had ever been made. See Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 828 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd,
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A fairly liberal admissibility standard for coconspirator statements
might be construed from a broad reading of Dutton. 6 The Dutton factors offer no special guidance for the admission of a coconspirator statement, however, because they simply parallel the traditional tests for
when hearsay is deemed reliable.77 A statement satisfying each factor
will therefore probably fall within other hearsay exceptions'8 and will
400 U.S. 74 (1970). Justice Marshall noted the basic ambiguity in the meaning of the
purported statement and the potential insincerity of the declarant. Dutton, 400 U.S. at
104 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Such questions leave gaping holes in the plurality's reliability inquiry that could only have been filled by cross-examination of the declarant. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall aptly noted:
If "indicia of reliability" are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is
only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent
vitality at all in protecting a criminal defendant. . . . [T]he Confrontation
Clause has been sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an indicium of a
probative likelihood can come in, no matter how damaging the statement may
be or how great the need for the truth-discovering test of cross-examination.
Id at 110.
76. For a discussion of the problems arising from the fact that such a liberal standard
has been construed, see infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text. One commentator
cites Dutton as a case standing for the proposition that modern procedures might achieve
results similar to those in the Raleigh trial, see supra note 2, if of less draconian dimensions, by admitting unreliable declarations against interest or coconspirator statements
against the accused when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. See Graham, supra note 2, at 101. Recognizing that the hearsay evidence in the Raleigh trial was
of the "rankest sort," it was hoped, but not concluded, that this sort of"political prosecution" would be unthinkable in today's enlightened age. Id.; see id at 144 ("contrary to
some lower court expressions, Green and Dutton did not repeal the Sixth Amendment").
77. The generally recognized elements for reliability in hearsay or any testimony are
the quality of the declarant's memory, clarity of expression, perception and sincerity. See
Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958-61 (1974). A weakness in the
reliability of a declarant's statement occurs when there is a deficiency in one of these
qualities. See id
The first Dutton factor-prohibition of express assertions about past facts, see supra
text accompanying note 71-looks to the guarantee of accurate memory. This memory
factor is also somewhat specific to coconspirator statement requirements, as accurate
memory is partially assured by Rule 801(d)(2)(E)'s furtherance and pendency requirements. The personal knowledge requirement, see supra text accompanying note 72, looks
to the guarantee of clarity; personal knowledge makes the recited facts less likely to be
ambiguous. First-hand knowledge is generally required of all witnesses, whether they are
available or not, unless admissions or expert testimony is being offered. Fed. R. Evid. 803
advisory committee note. The third Dutton factor, see supra text accompanying note 73,
is a mere recital of the accurate perception guarantee, which serves to lend validity to the
personal knowledge that the declarant is reporting. See Fed. . Evid. 803 advisory committee note (importance of personal knowledge). The fourth factor, see supra text accompanying note 74, is the sincerity element of the traditional tests for reliability. This
factor, which was considered optional by the advisory committee, see Fed. . Evid. art.
VIII advisory committee note, has been construed by some commentators to be guaranteed by the furtherance and pendency requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), see McCormick, supra note 5, § 267, at 793. Even statements in furtherance of the goals of the
conspiracy, however, can be unreliable. See Davenport, supra note 8, at 1387.
78. This is true because the "hearsay exceptions" are premised on reliability, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text, and the factors measure reliability, see supra note
77 and accompanying text. For example, a statement that would qualify under Rule
804(b)(1)'s former testimony exception would meet the Dutton factors: 1) the testimony
at the prior hearing would not have been an express assertion about past fact; 2) Rule 602
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In fact,

the Court found that the statement at issue in Dutton satisfied all four
factors"° and fell within other hearsay exceptions."1 Thus, because the
Dutton factors are enunciated as a group, 2 and because the statement in
Dutton was found to satisfy all four factors, there is no indication that
would make the coconspirator hearsatisfying some of the requirements
83
say sufficiently reliable.
B.

Roberts to the Rescue?

The Supreme Court made its most recent statement on when hearsay
does not infringe a defendant's confrontation right in Ohio v. Roberts,8 4 a
case involving the prior recorded testimony of a witness who was unproduced at trial.8 5 Unlike Dutton, Roberts gives a reasonably manageable
would enforce the requirement that the witness have personal knowledge about the facts
to which he testifies to eliminate ambiguity; 3) any question about the witness' perception
of the reported facts would be tested by cross-examination at the prior hearing; and 4)
sincerity would likewise have been tested by cross-examination at the prior hearing.
79. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160 (1970) for an example of former testimony, see supra note 78, admitted when the unavailability of the declarant was due to
memory failure.
80. See 400 U.S. at 88-89.
81. The plurality found that the statement in Dutton also fell under the exceptions for
spontaneous utterances, Fed. R. Evid. 803(2), and declarations against interest, Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(3). See 400 U.S. at 89.
82. See id. at 88-89.
83. Because coconspirator statement admissibiltiy is not based on a theory of the
statement's circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, it would appear reasonable to expect the statement to satisfy all four factors
before it is admitted. Other hearsay based on circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, however, might be reliably admitted with a lesser showing because of the greater
strength of the remaining factors. For example, an excited utterance, Fed. R. Evid.
803(2), may fall short of the ideal for accurate perception, because the excitement of the
moment could potentially blur the declarant's perceptions, Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory
committee note. The exception more than makes up for this deficiency, however, in the
strength of its assurances of sincerity and accurate memory. See id. In United States v.
Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978), and
United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090
(1976), however, the Ninth Circuit found that confrontation had been satisfied when only
three and two of the factors, respectively, had been satisfied by the coconspirator
statement.
84. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
85. The preliminary hearing transcript at issue featured the declarant, Anita Isaacs,
as the only witness for the defense-a poor choice, as things turned out, because Anita's
statements were adverse to the defendant's interests, rather than exculpatory. See id. at
58. Because Anita was never declared hostile, the defense attorney's questioning at the
preliminary hearing was technically not "cross-examination." See id.
Before the trial, Anita departed Ohio for parts unknown and even her parents could
not reach her. Id. at 60. Thus, the prosecutor introduced Anita's testimony at trial
through the preliminary hearing transcript, and the defendant was convicted. Id. The
Ohio Court of Apeals reversed, finding the transcript inadmissible because Anita was not
"cross-examined" per se at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 61.
The Supreme Court found no confrontation violation because the prior questioning of
Anita, although not characterized as cross-examination under state procedural rules, was
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test for determining when hearsay can be admitted without violating a
defendant's confrontation rights. The elements of the test, however, still
require clarification.
1. The Unavailability Requirement
The Roberts opinion gave concrete expression to the always-implicit
complementary concepts that the confrontation clause establishes a rule
of necessity,86 and that using hearsay in lieu of an available witness
violates confrontation principles.87 The prosecution therefore has an
affirmative burden of producing the declarant or demonstrating his unavailability before the admission of hearsay can be considered.8" The

prosecution can satisfy this burden by showing a "good faith effort" to

produce the declarant 8 9 Although unavailability can take many
forms,9 0 and although the procedural hurdles of demonstrating a "good
faith effort" apparently require no superhuman efforts to produce the

witness,91 this requirement nevertheless serves to help safeguard the de-

sufficient cross-examination in form and in substance to satisfy the defendant's confrontation right. See id. at 70-71.
86. 448 U.S. at 65.
87. See id. ("[T]he prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant."). In his
concurrence in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-73 (1970), Justice Harlan warns
against indiscriminate equation of confrontation and cross-examination, however, because such a constitutionalizing of the hearsay rule would have a "stultifying effect...
upon. . . the law of evidence." Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., concurring). Such a rule would
always prohibit the admission of any hearsay of an unproduced declarant, a result that
has generally been considered too extreme an interpretation. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63;
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); Green, 399 U.S. at 175; Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII
advisory committee note.
88. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
89. Id. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
90. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) lists the acceptable reasons for the unavailability
of a witness, including a declarant's: 1) declaration of a valid privilege; 2) persistent
refusal to testify; 3) claimed lack of memory; 4) death or physical or mental impairment;
or 5) remaining absent from the trial despite reasonable effort to procure his attendance.
The viability of these various forms of unavailabilty is reviewed in Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)
advisory committee note.
In his dissent to California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 202 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
Justice Brennan draws a sensible distinction between the types of unavailability for confrontation purposes. The first three categories are classified as a "failure to testify because
of unwillingness to do so or inability to remember," and would not serve as a sufficient
showing of unavailability for confrontation purposes. Id. This is because of the impact
these circumstances have on the jury's consideration of the proffered hearsay. Id. at 20102; see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965) (witness' reliance on his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a form of unavailability worked against
the defendant by "creat[ing] a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both
that the statement has been made and that it was true"). Physical unavailability, however, is a neutral factor, incapable of being cured or caused, see Green, 399 U.S. at 202
(Brennan, J., dissenting) and would be an adequate type of unavailability for confrontation purposes.
91. In Roberts, delivering five subpoenas to Anita's parents' home, three of which
were issued after it was known that she no longer lived there, and taking no other action
to locate or contact Anita during the four months preceding the trial when the prosecu-
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fendant's confrontation right.
The "good faith effort" standard may require no effort to produce the
witness if there is no possibility of success.9 2 In addition, the Court
adopted from Dutton a "remote utility" exception 93 that excuses production of the declarant whenever production would be unduly inconvenient

for the prosecution or of such small benefit to the defendant that the
possibility of cross-examination showing the hearsay statement to be unreliable is "wholly unreal." 94
2.

The Reliability Requirement

The Roberts Court held that when the unavailability of the declarant

or the remote utility of cross-examination is demonstrated, the confrontation clause requires that hearsay bear "adequate 'indicia of reliabil-

ity' "9' before it can be admitted. Reliability will be inferred without
separate exploration for such indicia if the statement falls within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception." 96 If the statement does not satisfy a
"firmly rooted" exception, it must be excluded unless it contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 97
a.

"Firmly Rooted Exceptions"

If the "good faith efforts to produce" standard is uncertain, 98 even less
clear is which of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule are among the
tion knew of her absence, might reasonably be classified as less than a "good faith effort."
448 U.S. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 74. Because of the "reasonable" level of effort required to produce a
declarant under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5), it would seem prudent to take the
Court's example of the intervening death of a witness, see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74, as the
only situation in which there is "no possibility," id., of producing the declarant, and
therefore requiring no effort to produce. In all other situations, some effort to produce
the witness should be undertaken to meet the good faith standard.
93. See id. at 65 n.7; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.

94. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. The remote utility exception would be best confined to a
small set of hearsay exceptions, such as those for public records, official statements,
learned treatises, and trade reports. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Admission without production of the declarant in these situations would be acceptable
because the statements contained in these documents are usually made without contemplation of the litigation and would not be likely to have been manufactured insincerely.
The remote utility exception should not, however, be extended to other potentially less
sincere forms of hearsay such as coconspirator statements through unfounded conclusions that the value of cross-examination would be minimal.
95. 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972) (quoting
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970))).
96. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
97. Id.

98. That the standard is uncertain can quickly be gathered from a comparison of
what efforts the Roberts Court held to establish constitutional unavailability, see id. at 7577, with what efforts Justice Brennan would have required on the same facts, see id. at 79
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Clearly, reasonable Justices differ on the standard of good faith
effort.
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"firmly rooted."9 9 The vintage of the exception does not seem to be the
most important consideration because the Court mentions in illustration
the very reliable business records exception, " which is a relative newcomer to the forest of hearsay exceptions.' 0 ' The Court also acknowledges that this group includes the dying declarations exception 0 2 and the
former testimony exception, 10 3 both of which have had traditional
Supreme Court recognition as reliable forms of hearsay," ° and both of
which have been acknowledged to satisfy the confrontation clause.'0 5
These illustrations, coupled with the fact that the "firmly rooted" concept is expressed as a way of showing "indicia of reliability," dictate that
the Court meant "firmly rooted" to encompass only those statements
that it believes to be reliable. 10 6 Unfortunately, some lower courts have
seemed to equate "firmly rooted" with "long used." 0 7 This equation
offends common sense because the vintage of an exception has little to do
with the "indicia of reliability" of the exception.' 0 8
99. The Court recites only four hearsay exceptions as "firmly rooted," but its citation
form leads one to assume that there may be others. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8
(Court states, "See, eg.,. . . dying declarations,. . . cross-examined prior trial testimony,. . . business and public records") (citations omitted).
100. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee note
and McCormick, supra note 5, §§ 304-314, for a discussion of the reliability of the business records exception.
101. The business records exception to the hearsay rule was not recognized at common
law. See e.g., Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 126, 170 N.E. 517, 519 (1930) (discussion
of early common law exclusion of business records). Congress adopted the first statutory
recognition of the business records exception in 1936. Fed. I Evid. 803(6) advisory
committee note. Several other hearsay exceptions, however, may even have existed at the
time that the sixth amendment was ratified in the late eighteenth century. See Green, 399
U.S. at 178 n.12 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
103. rd
104. See, eg., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (preliminary hearing testimony); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dying declarations and preliminary
hearing testimony); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (dying declarations); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (dying declarations and prior
testimony); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472-74 (1900) (prior testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (dying declarations and prior

testimony).
105. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (preliminary hearing testimony); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (dying declarations) (dictum);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (dying declarations and prior testimony) (dictum).
106. In this analysis of the meaning of "firmly rooted," a plain meaning of the term is
eschewed because the Court has planted the term in the contextual soil of reliability, not
longevity. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Until the Court announces what other exceptions
"rest upon such solid foundations," id., it would be best to treat reliability of exceptions
as a proposition to be proved, not presumed, under the aegis of "firmly rooted."
107. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
108. The dying declaration exception, for example, has features besides its longevity to
recommend it. Psychological pressures faced by the dying declarant, as well as limits on
the content of the statement and circumstances surrounding its making, provide some
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"ParticularizedGuarantees of Trustworthiness"

After stating some reasons to admit hearsay evidence, 0 9 the Roberts
Court reiterated the exclusionary nature of its hearsay policy. For confrontation clause purposes, unless a witness can be shown to be unavailable, and unless the hearsay exception falls among the "firmly rooted," the
statement must be excluded absent a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 1 o
The kinds and the quantity of guarantees that will suffice are questions
left to the laboratories of the lower courts. A collective reading of the
Supreme Court's confrontation clause decisions, however, shows that the
hearsay, the admission of which was deemed not to have violated the
defendant's confrontation rights, was usually some form of cross-examined testimony of a witness who was unproduced at trial."' In such
cases, even though the declarant is unproduced at a later phase of the
proceeding, the defendant has been provided with at least minimal confrontation protections.1 1 z The Court's focus therefore has been on the
guarantees of reliability and are more reasonable explanations for its inclusion among the
"firmly rooted" exceptions than its vintage.
It is arguable that firmly rooted exceptions might be those that were recognized when
the constitution was ratified, inferring the framers' implicit approval of these exceptions.
This theory is unsatisfactory, however, because it is unclear how many exceptions were
recognized when the sixth amendment was ratified. See California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 178 & n. 12 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). More importantly, it is unclear whether
the framers intended such exceptions to be admitted as reliable; the confrontation clause
may have been designed to exclude statements falling under exceptions whenever they
were unreliable. See supra note 20 and accompanying text, infra note 220 text
accompanying.
109. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
110. Id. (emphasis added). Had the court wished to make the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" inquiry stand for a policy of admissibility, it could instead have
stated that hearsay evidence can be admitted on a "showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."
111. See id. at 70 (declarant was cross-examined "as a matter ofform" at the preliminary hearing) (emphasis in original); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1972)
(adequate cross-examination of declarant at preliminary hearing); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970) (prior cross-examined recorded testimony held admissible when
declarant claimed lack of memory at trial); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 260, 265
(1904) (prior cross-examined written testimony held admissible), overruled on other
grounds, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895) (prior cross-examined recorded testimony held admissible when declarant died prior to trial); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1879) (prior crossexamined recorded testimony held admissible when defense causes declarant's absence
from trial); cf. Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1984) (admission
of corroborating document without producing the declarant for cross-examination violated the confrontation clause).
112. Of course, the effectiveness of the preliminary hearing cross-examination will affect whether the prior confrontation aided the defendant's probe for truth. See, e.g.,
United States v. Touchstone, 726 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th Cir. 1984) (cross-examination
cannot be so limited that it prevents a defendant from exposing a witness' testimonial
motive and bias); United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (6th Cir. 1974) (limiting
cross-examination to expose witness bias and motive to falsify is an abuse of trial court
discretion when the information developed is not corroborated by other evidence); Spaeth
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reliability of the statement, because only reliable hearsay can substitute
for a defendant's right to confront his accusers. 1 3 It does not appear
that the Court, in announcing this "particularized guarantees" standard,
meant to open the floodgates to hearsay testimony. Greater than garden
variety reliability is therefore still required to satisfy the confrontation
clause, and unreliable hearsay should be excluded under the "particularized guarantees" standard.
II.

APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S STANDARDS TO ADMIT
COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS

The circuit courts' search for "adequate indicia of reliability" in
coconspirator statements by unproduced declarants follows either the
"firmly rooted exceptions" approach 1 4 or the "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" inquiry," 5 but almost always results in the admission
of the coconspirator's statement. 1 6 Some courts avoid the search altogether." 7 All seem to have fallen prey to the rationale that coconv.United States, 232 F.2d 776, 779 (6th Cir. 1956) (conviction reversed due to an abuse
of discretion in limiting cross-examination-a denial of "a substantial right" and withdrawal of "one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial") (quoting Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)).
The right to confrontation is violated when the defendant has been denied any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4
(1966), or when the defendant is denied the right of effective cross-examination because of
a state interest less compelling than the confrontation right, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 319 (1974), or when the defendant was not represented by counsel at the preliminary
hearing, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
113. Justice Harlan viewed the need for reliability primarily as part of the broader due
process guarantee that convictions must be based only on trustworthy evidence. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Thus, his confrontation inquiry ends when the witness is shown to be unavailable, and the due process
inquiry begins to determine whether the hearsay is reliable enough to admit without an
available declarant. See id. at 174, 186 n.20. Whether that reliability is measured under a
confrontation or a due process approach matters little, as long as the defendant is assured
that only reliable evidence will be weighed by the trier of fact in determining his guilt or
innocence.
By announcing this standard under the auspices of confrontation, the Court is imposing a stricter standard of reliability than due process would require. Due process would
exclude evidence only when it is very likely to be false. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
99-100 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (exclusion of evidence that is "unduly inflammatory" is a commendable practice, but not "essential to a fair trial" under principles of
due process); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 187 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (right
of cross-examination is an element of "broader due process requirement that a conviction
cannot be founded on no evidence"); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)
(convictions based on critical pretrial identification will not be set aside unless procedure
was so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"). Confrontation, however, demands an affirmative search for
guarantees; if they are not found, the hearsay must be excluded. Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
114. See infra notes 122-23, 154 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 122-23, 154.
117. See infra Pt. II.C.
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spirator hearsay is a necessary prosecutorial tool 1 in this murky area of
criminal activity. 19 The prosecution's need, however, is to present reliable evidence to the trier of fact, not to amass unreliable evidence to convict. 12 0 Both schools of thought have failed to recognize the Supreme
Court's concern that hearsay be reliable before it is admitted, 2 I and have
applied Roberts and Dutton too broadly in admitting coconspirator
statements.
A.

The CoconspiratorException as "FirmlyRooted"

Many of the circuit courts hold, presumably because of its longevity,
that the coconspirator exception is firmly rooted. 22 At most, these
courts look only to the prosecution's satisfaction of the unavailability requirement before admitting the hearsay, and make no inquiry into its
reliability." 3 As demonstrated, however, because the Roberts Court used
118. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 n.16 (1970).
121. See supra notes 18, 55, 111-12 and accompanying text.
122. This categorization of the coconspirator exception as "firmly rooted"--or its preRoberts equivalent that satisfying the coconspirator exception or Rule 801(d)(2)(E) satisfies the confrontation clause-has repeatedly allowed courts to dismiss confrontation
challenges with at most a mere statement of the "firmly rooted" doctrine. See, e.g.,
United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v.
Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United
States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1285 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock,
654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981), vacatedpercuriam in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d
356 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983); cf. Ottomano v. United States,
468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972) (pre-Roberts court finding no merit in the confrontation
claim because the statement was admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973).
The coconspirator exception can be traced to its use in seventeenth century England,
where it facilitated the prosecution of alleged treason. See Mueller, supra note 36, at 32526. The exception was later adopted by the Supreme Court in 1827, permitting coconspirator hearsay to be used as substantive evidence when made "in furtherance of the
objects of the [conspiracy]." United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 470
(1827). See supra note 37 for a discussion of the facts in Gooding that distinguish it from
the usual modern-day coconspirator issue.
The presumption that longevity underlies the courts' reasoning in admitting coconspirator hearsay is not based on direct statements by the courts, because they do not
linger over the issue once they announce that the statements are "firmly rooted," or state
the equivalent concept from the days before Roberts-that satisfying Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
defeats the confrontation challenge. See cases cited infra note 123. The presumption
seems to be a reasonable inference from the lack of discussion about admitting the evidence. Certainly a rationale based on the evidence's reliability would require further
exploration.
123. See United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1984) (evidence
admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) satisfies the confrontation clause); United States v. MeLemon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d
1040, 1051-52 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3535 (1984); United States v.
Bernal, 719 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983) (court holds that coconspirator hearsay is
admissible as "firmly rooted" even though the Ninth Circuit usually conducts search for
reliability, see infra notes 153-54, 157, 161-62 and accompanying text); United States v.
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the term "firmly rooted" as a component of "adequate indicia of reliabil-

ity," the term must connote reliability in order to satisfy confrontation
principles: It cannot simply mean old or long-used. 124 When measuring
the reliability of coconspirator statements in terms of sincerity, ambiguity, perception and memory,125 it becomes obvious that the coconspirator
statement is not "firmly rooted." Because they have a special incentive
to shift blame to one another, coconspirators are likely to bend the truth
of their statements. 126 They are also likely to speak in code words or
names that make the identification of their meaning or subject matter
ambiguous.' 27 Because the nature of conspiracy requires sharing of information only on a "need-to-know" basis, a coconspirator may be unaware of facets of a conspiracy beyond his own particular role, and may
Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 987 n.7 (7th Cir.) (satisfying Rule 801(d)(2)(E) satisfies the confrontation clause), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 486 (1983); United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d
308, 312 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v.Lurz, 666
F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981) (same), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United States v.
Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1285 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (confrontation clause not violated by
admission of coconspirator hearsay) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)); United
States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (coconspirator exception is "firmly
rooted"), vacatedper curiam in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.

denied, 104 S.Ct. 404 (1983); cf Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.
1972) (pre-Roberts court finding no merit in the confrontation claim because the statement was admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1128 (1973).
These courts also do not address the availability prong of the Roberts requirements in
their abbreviated inquiries. See, e.g., Chiavola, 744 F.2d at 1276; McLernon, 746 F.2d at
1106; Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1051; Xheka, 704 F.2d at 987 n.7; Lurz, 666 F.2d at 81;
Bruner, 657 F.2d at 1285 & n.8. One court does acknowledge the existence of the requirement, however, when it excuses the prosecution from any effort to produce a deceased declarant. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 349.
124. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
125. These are the elements that guarantee reliability. See supra note 77.
126. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)
(statements of a codefendant are especially suspect because of their potential for insincerity). The pendency and furtherance requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) usually will not
adequately assure sincerity. See Davenport, supra note 8, at 1385-88. If bending the
truth does not take the form of shifting blame to other members of the conspiracy, coconspirators may instead fabricate statements about the goals or members of the conspiracy
in order to further its goals. Levie, supra note 36, at 1165-66; see, e.g., United States v.
Piccolo, 696 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir.) (untruthful statement to allay participant's anxiety), vacated on other grounds, 705 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2342

(1984); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 534 (8th Cir.) (recruiting hyperboles),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
127. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 104 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Davenport, supra note 8, at 1388; Levie, supra note 36, at 1165-66. A caption in a federal
conspiracy opinion typifies the difficulty in determining the identity of coconspirators.
See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907
(1980). The full caption is a maze of potential for mistaken meaning: "United States

v. Leroy BARNES, a/k/a 'Nicky', Steven Baker, a/k/a 'Jerry', Steven Monsanto,
a/k/a 'Fat Stevie', John Hatcher, a/k/a 'Bo', Joseph Hayden, a/k/a 'James Hayden', a/
k/a 'Freeman Hayden', a/k/a 'Jazz',. . .Leon Johnson, a/k/a 'JJ.', Waymin Hines, a/
k/a 'Wop', Leonard Rollock, a/k/a 'Petey', . . . Walter Centeno, a/k/a 'Chico Bob'
... ""Id. at 121. Who is to say which alias might be invoked by whom in a particular
conversation in furtherance of the conspiracy?
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misperceive the roles of others.' 2 8 Only the memory factor of reliability

is somewhat ensured by Rule 801(d)(2)(E), because the rule requires that
129
the statement have been made during the course of the conspiracy.
Given the large potential for faulty perception, however, even accurate
memory is no guarantee of reliability.
The "firmly rooted" courts assume that satisfying the furtherance and
pendency requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is equivalent to satisfying

the confrontation clause. 130 None of the Federal Rules, however,

presumes to supplant basic constitutional guarantees. 3 ' As noted, the
confrontation clause usually affords a criminal defendant greater protection than the hearsay rule was ever designed to provide.' 32 The hearsay
exceptions are merely procedural rules that must be applied within the

appropriate constitutional limitations.

33

They do not assure constitu-

128. See Davenport, supra note 8, at 1388; Levie, supra note 36, at 1173. In United
States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1984),
Stephen Gibbs was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana on the testimony of a
coconspirator, Quintiliano, see id. at 839, who was indicted but not produced at trial, id.
at 847-48. Two unindicted coconspirators reported at trial Quintiliano's statement that
"Jake" had agreed to purchase the smuggled marijuana. Id. at 841. Aside from the
double hearsay problem, the witnesses had no personal knowledge, beyond what Quintiliano told them, of "Jake's" identity or his role in the conspiracy. See id. If Gibbs had
ever used the name "Jake," it was not clear that he continued to identify with the alias, or
whether another person might have been using the alias as well. Thus, the testimony was
riddled with potential for unreliable, misconstrued, second-hand inferences that should
hardly serve as the basis on which to convict a defendant.
Although the Third Circuit looks for guarantees of reliability, see United States v.
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983), and requires
independent evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy before it will admit the
coconspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), see Ammar, 714 F.2d at 256-57;
United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1976), it nevertheless admitted the
coconspirator statement in Gibbs without significant debate. See 739 F.2d at 839-40. The
court found that "the independent evidence . . . while not weighty, was nevertheless
sufficient." Id. at 843.
129. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1984); United
States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Xheka, 704
F.2d 974, 987 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983); United States v. Lurz,
666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982).
131. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note (to avoid "collisions"
between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule, hearsay exceptions are couched in
terms of exemptions from the hearsay exclusionary principles rather than in positive
terms of admissibility); Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee note (same); Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(3) advisory committee note (declarations against interest "rule does not purport to
deal with questions of the right of confrontation"); InculpatoryStatements, supra note 28,
at 178 ("Federal Rules of Evidence speak only to evidentiary principles, and do not concern the constitutional admissibility of evidence").
132. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
133. For example, the confrontation clause would require the prosecution to produce
or demonstrate the unavailability of a Rule 803 declarant, unless there were no possibility
of production or production would be of remote utility to the defendant. See supra notes
87-94 and accompanying text. Availability is immaterial, however, under Rule 803. Fed.
R. Evid. 803; see Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee note.
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tionality in and of themselves.134
It is arguable that just as the Roberts Court and older Supreme Court
cases found statements made within the dying declaration exception-an
exception much criticized for its unreliable basis t35-to be constitutionally admissible,13 6 so too may the coconspirator statement be numbered
among the "firmly rooted." This argument does not stand up to close
scrutiny, however, because even dying declarations-the least reliable of
the firmly rooted exceptions recognized by the Court137-are more reliable138 and necessary than coconspirator statements for a number of reasons. First, early Supreme Court cases cast the dying declaration
exception in its current limited form, allowing admission only of statements by a homicide victim that relate to the fact and the perpetrator of
the homicide' 39 -a very narrow field of comment. The more narrow the
field of admissible statements, the more likely the exception attempts to
guarantee reliability." 4 In contrast, the subject matter of coconspirator
134. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970) ("[H]earsay rules. . . for the
admission of evidence against a defendant, will often raise questions of compatibility with
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation."). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892) (recognizing that dying
declarations must be admitted with care); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) Notes of Comm. on the
Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 7051, 7089 ("Committee did not consider dying declarations as among the
most reliable forms of hearsay"); McCormick, supra note 5, § 281, at 828 (the dying
declarations exception is "the most mystical in its theory and traditionally the most arbitrary in its limitations"); Confrontation, supra note 4, at 1435 n.9 (criticizing the reliability of dying declarations); Martin, supra note 18, at 26, col. 1 (same).
Despite these misgivings, the advisory committee not only retained the exception, but
expanded its application to civil matters, with the only retort to the critics that "[w]hile
the original religious justification for the exception may have lost its conviction for some
persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures
are present" to induce the truth in dying declarations. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) advisory
committee note.
136. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 & n.8 (1980) (finding dying declarations to
be constitutionally admissible); accord Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
(1911); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
137. Compare supra note 100 and accompanying text (reliability of business records)
and supra note 111 (Supreme Court's many holdings that prior testimony can be sufficiently reliable) with supra note 135 (unreliability of dying declarations).
138. See supra note 108.
139. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472-73 (1900); Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151-52 (1892). Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(2) permits admission of dying declarations in "a prosecution for homicide
[when] . . .a statement [was] made by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending
death." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2).
140. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory committee note (limitations on the subject matter a factor in assuring reliability in spontaneous utterances); cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)
(present sense impression exception limits statements to descriptions or explanations of
perceived events); Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (spontaneous utterance exception limits statements to those that relate to the startling event); Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) (medical diagnosis
or treatment exception limits statements to those for the purpose of and pertinent to
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statements is limited only by the "furtherance" and "pendency" requirements, leaving a wide field of comment and consequently more room for
error or falsehood.141 Second, the dying declarant's statement is consid-

ered to have reliability guarantors similar to those in an oath,142 and until
the value of the oath as a source of reliability is rejected, 43 the dying
declaration's rationale will doubtless live on. Coconspirators' statements, on the other hand, are not similarly sacred, 1" so these statements

cannot be analogized to an oath.' 45 Finally, the death of the declarant

adds an element of necessity in admitting dying declarations,' 4 6 which
the Court recognizes
in its admonition to receive such evidence with the
"utmost caution." '47 There is no similar caution applied to the receipt of
coconspirator statements,1 48 nor is the necessity element similar unless
medical diagnosis and treatment); Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (records of regularly conducted
activities exception limits statements to records made near the time of a regularly conducted business activity by a person with knowledge, where such records are routinely
maintained); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (former testimony exception limits statements to
testimony from another proceeding at which the producing party had a similar opportunity and motive to develop the evidence through direct or cross-examination). It is likely
that the narrowing of these exceptions contributes to the their being premised on guarantees of trustworthiness.
141. For example, a conspirator might fabricate about the goals or members of a conspiracy in order to entice new recruits to join the venture. The statements would be in
furtherance of a pending conspiracy if the new members would be necessary to its actual
goals, but would remain fabrication. For a discussion of how little the furtherance and
pendency requirements add to the reliability of coconspirator admissions, see Davenport,
supra note 8, at 1385-88.
142. The Supreme Court found that the imminence of death enforced "as strict [an]
adherence to the truth as the obligation of an oath could impose." Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892).
143. Like the "religious justification" for dying declarations, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2)
advisory committee note, the oath as a guarantor of trustworthiness has lost some of its
vitality over the years, although it too may exert some level of "psychological [pressure],"
id., presumably in the form of a witness' fear of penalties for pejury.
The advisory committee acknowledged that the oath is "perhaps less effective than in
an earlier time," Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note, and that the mere
presence of an oath has never been sufficient to remove the statement from a hearsay
category, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) advisory committee note. The oath is, however, an
express requirement for the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). Thus its value apparently has not been completely eroded.
144. See supra notes 36, 125-29 and accompanying text.
145. Coconspirator statements do not share with dying declarations either the religious
or psychological inducement for truth. See supra note 143.
146. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892).
147. Id.
148. For examples of cases admitting coconspirator statements without any caution or
mention of their unreliability, see United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1274-76 (7th
Cir. 1984); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1051-52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3535 (1984);
United States v. Bernal, 719 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Xheka, 704
F.2d 974, 987 & n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983); United States v. Lurz,
666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United States v.
Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1285 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d
339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981), vacatedpercuriam in part on other grounds, 686 F.2d 356
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the coconspirator declarant is deceased. Thus, procedurally and philo-

sophically, the dying declaration exception has been narrowed to a range
that can be reliable if used with care. Coconspirator statements, how-

ever, share no features with even this weakest of the "firmly rooted" exceptions recognized by the Court.
Because the Supreme Court has gone through some effort to indicate
that only reliable hearsay can be admitted without violating a defendant's
confrontation rights, 49 and because the coconspirator exception has long
been recognized as founded in principles other than reliability, 5 coconspirator hearsay by an unavailable declarant cannot be admitted with
only a simple finding that it is long-used or presumptively constitutional,

and therefore reliable. Despite the Court's current belief that some of the
exclusionary rules designed to protect criminal defendants should be

eliminated,151 it has always maintained that only reliable evidence should

underlie convictions. 5 2 Bringing Rule 801(d)(2)(E) within the require-

ments of the confrontation clause therefore requires a search for, rather
than a irrebutable presumption of, reliability.
B. Searchingfor Indicia of Reliability on a Case-by-Case Basis

Recognizing the need for greater assurances of reliability than the procedural requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provide, other circuits are taking the better approach by conducting searches, with varying levels of

intensity, for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in coconspirator statements.153 These searches have proved to be remarkably
(5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983); United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827,
836 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 661 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273
(1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973).
149. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see supra notes 18, 55, 111-12 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 26, 36-44 and accompanying text.
151. In the 1983-84 Term, the Court made a pronounced retreat from many of the
previously sacred exclusionary protections for criminal defendants. See, eg., United
States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419-20 (1984) (objectively reasonable reliance on a defective search warrant will not require exclusion of evidence obtained prior to realization
of the defect); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632 (1984) ("public safety" exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Statements of a suspect in custody,
although made prior to the suspect's receipt of "Miranda" warnings, are admissible if the
delay was due to "overriding concerns of public safety"); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct.
2501, 2509-10 (1984) (illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the prosecution can
prove that it would "inevitably" have been discovered by lawful means).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has not viewed these Supreme Court decisions as giving
carte blanche to begin convicting defendants with evidence supplied by anonymous accusers or ex parte affidavits. See United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802 (9th Cir.
1984) (ledger entries by unknown declarants, admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), violated the defendant's confrontation rights; prosecutor cannot satisfy the unavailability
showing without knowing who the declarants are).
152. See supra notes 18, 55, 111-12 and accompanying text.
153. See, eg., United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1984); United
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successful, 1 54 given both the high standard of reliability needed to overcome the exclusionary presumption underlying the reliability require156
ment,' 5 5 and the generally unreliable nature of coconspirator hearsay.

The searches are also notable for their abbreviated level of inquiry, making it doubtful whether the reliability issue has been adequately addressed.' 5 7 Furthermore, before conducting their abridged searches for
reliability, many of these courts have failed to examine whether the declarant is in fact unavailable, or is available but not produced.' 58 BeStates v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 156 (1984); United
States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3543
(1984); United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 561 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1423 (1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir.
1981); cf United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
917 (1979) (pre-Roberts case in which court looks for guarantees of trustworthiness);
United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir. 1976) (pre-Robertscourt deciding on
admissibility of hearsay on a case-by-case basis), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
154. See United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that
coconspirator statement contained sufficient indicia of reliability and was not crucial to
the prosecution's case); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.) (statement
held to be reliable because four reliability factors from Dutton were satisfied), cert. deied, 105 S. Ct. 156 (1984); United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir.
1983) (statement held to be reliable because part of an ongoing transaction about which
the declarant had personal knowledge), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3543 (1984); United States
v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 561 (9th Cir. 1983) (statements sufficiently reliable under a
Dutton analysis), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d
238, 256-57 (3d Cir.) (sufficient indicia of reliability), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983);
United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1044 (1982); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (testimony
reliable because of surrounding circumstances); cf. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31,
38 (2d Cir. 1978) (pre-Roberts case in which testimony was found to be reliable and
neither crucial nor devastating), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500-02 (8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
155. See supra notes 18, 55, 110-12 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 36, 126-29 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1984) (reliability
search consists of brief recitation of Dutton factors and conclusion that the statement at
issue is reliable, without analysis of its attributes); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615,
621 (9th Cir.) (although acknowledging Roberts availability and reliability requirements,
court merely recites Dutton factors and finds statement reliable without analysis), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 156 (1984); United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir.
1983) (court finds statement reliable simply because it occurred during an ongoing transaction about which the declarant had personal knowledge of the participants' identities;
no inquiry into declarant's sincerity or clarity of expression), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3543
(1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.) (although the source and
reality of declarant's personal knowledge were unclear, court finds statement reliable
without further inquiry), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Castillo, 615
F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (court cites Dutton factors and finds statement reliable
simply because it is not an express assertion about a past fact).
158. The courts searching for particularized guarantees often give short shrift to the
availability inquiry, much like the "firmly rooted" courts do, see supra note 123. For
examples of courts overlooking the availability inquiry, and thus the necessity for the
coconspirator statements, see United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir.
1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
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cause coconspirator statements do not typically contain the guarantees of
trustworthiness contained in the "hearsay exceptions, "' 5 9 it is especially
important to first examine the necessity for admitting out-of-court coconspirator statements in place of an available declarant. 1 °
After permitting the prosecutor to skirt the availability issue, some of
these circuits have resurrected the Dutton tests for reliability of hearsay
t6
statements and have applied them to the coconspirator admissions. 1
Two circuits have not considered the Dutton factors to be a cohesive
whole, however, and have considered satisfaction of less than all of the
factors to be sufficient to meet the reliability requirement.1 6 As dis344 (1983); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1044 (1982); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. United
States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (pre-Roberts case in which court did not
focus on availability of declarant), cert denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v.
Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500-02 (8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
The Third Circuit, however, has very recently begun to recognize the importance of
the availability prong of Roberts. Recognizing that the prosecution has a duty to make a
good faith effort to produce the declarant at trial, the court has reversed two conspiracy
convictions when the only showing of unavailability was the prosecution's assertion that
the declarants would presumably assert their fifth amendment privilege not to testify. See
United States v. Caputo, No. 82-1791, slip op. at 17 (3d Cir. March 29, 1985) (prosecution's representations that declarant would have "taken the fifth. . . fall short of the
Confrontation Clause's demands"); United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir.
1984) (conviction reversed because of prosecution's failure to show that declarant was
unavailable to testify; statements were therefore not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
This new focus on the necessity for coconspirator hearsay under confrontation standards
marks an important step in the preservation of the defendant's fundamental trial guarantees, and should be emulated by other circuits.
159. See supra note 36.
160. United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1367 n.II (9th Cir. 1980).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d
615, 621 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 105 S.Ct. 156 (1984); United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d
548, 561 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1423 (1984); United States v. Ammar,
714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United States v.
Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); United
States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.) (applies all four
factors to statement but reasons that less than all need be satisfied in every case), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 156 (1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256-57 (3d Cir.)
(reciting four Dutton factors, yet holding that declarant's possible lack of personal knowledge did not make the statement reversibly unreliable), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344
(1983); United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 1983) (all elements need not
be present where little risk that jury would give undue weight to the statement), cert
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1602 (1984); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th
Cir.) (Dutton factors are not exhaustive considerations, nor need all be satisfied every
time), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1081
(9th Cir. 1977) (finding statement reliable where three of four Dutton factors satisfied),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir.
1975) (only two factors satisfied but statement deemed reliable), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976). But cf. United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 792, 803-04 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that although all Dutton factors need not be satisfied, failure to present evidence
of any of the four, or of any other guarantee of trustworthiness, makes the statement
inadmissible).
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cussed, it is questionable whether the factors were ever meant to be used

piecemeal rather than in the conjunctive. 163 Taken together, these re-

quirements may indeed be a useful measure of reliability," 4 but when
their application is diluted by reducing the number applied, they cannot
ensure sufficient trustworthiness under the confrontation clause when the
declarant is not produced.' 65 Even pursuing the correct approach under
Roberts, therefore, has led to unwarranted manipulation in the search for

particularized guarantees, resulting in the admission of unreliable coconspirator statements.
C. Avoiding the Search for Reliability
In some cases, both schools of thought have avoided the reliability

search altogether. These courts have excused trial admission of coconspirator hearsay without having to reach the confrontation issue in either
of two ways: by finding it to be harmless error or by finding that the
defendant waived his confrontation right.
1. The Harmless Error Excuse
When a coconspirator's statement should not have been admitted be163. See supra notes 7074, 82 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
165. A requirement that statements satisfy all four factors is even more compelling in
the case of coconspirator admissions because they enjoy no basis in trustworthiness, see
supra note 36 and accompanying text, and must therefore overcome the testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception and erroneous memory, see Tribe,
supra note 77, at 959.
In United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906
(1977), the court acknowledged that the coconspirator hearsay did not even meet the
admissibility criteria for the coconspirator exception, much less the confrontation clause.
See 571 F.2d at 1078-79. The court found no confrontation problem, however, when
three of the four factors were clearly met and there was little likelihood that the trier of
fact would be misled. See id. at 1081. The factor dispensed with was the prohibition
against express assertions about past fact-the memory factor. Id. The Federal Rules of
Evidence specifically excluded statements of memory to prove the fact asserted in Rule
803(3), a necessary step to prevent the "virtual destruction of the hearsay rule." Fed. R.
Evid. 803(3) advisory committee note. This is thus the least desirable factor to abandon if
one is seeking to overcome testimonial infirmities.
An even earlier Ninth Circuit opinion found coconspirator hearsay that satisfied only
two of the Dutton factors to be sufficiently reliable to overcome a confrontation challenge.
See United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976). Again the statement was an express assertion of past fact, id. at 735,
-faulty memory potential-and the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement did not remove all reason to believe that the declarant had no motive to misrepresent the defendant's involvement, id.,-insincerity potential. Only the declarant's
personal knowledge and the unlikeliness of faulty perception were present as factors to
support admissibility. Id. at 735.
What remains is prejudicial hearsay with little assurance of accurate perception and
clarity, and no assurance of sincerity or accurate memory. To make matters worse, the
court found nothing crucial to the prosecution or devastating to the defense in the statement, even though it constituted a "significant portion of the testimony at trial." Id. at
735.
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cause of its questionable reliability, appellate courts sometimes excuse
the violation of the defendant's confrontation rights if the weight of the
other evidence against him indicates that the admission of the coconspirator's statement was "harmless." '66 If an error is of constitutional
proportion, the prosecution on appeal must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt167 that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights,'6 8
injure the defendant's case in any way, or otherwise contribute to the
verdict.1 69
If the prosecution fails to satisfy this burden, it must suffer
170
reversal.

"[S]ome constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."'

71

Although the con-

frontation right has not yet been included in these fundamental rights, it
should be recognized as among them. The automatic reversal penalty is
designed to discourage prosecutors from indulging in blatant violations
of a defendant's constitutional rights, 172 and this deterrence policy was
166. See United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 640 (8th Cir. 1984) (despite clear unreliability and no showing of unavailability, court holds admission to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); United States v. O'Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that statement did not qualify for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because it was not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but finding error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt in light of other evidence), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1198 (1985); United
States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. CastiUo, 615 F.2d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1980) (statement not in furtherance of conspiracy
should not have been admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E); nevertheless, if statement is reliable under the Dutton factors, it is not an error of constitutional proportions and need
only be shown that it more probably than not was harmless).
167. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
168. See id. at 23; see also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (error affecting the substantial rights of a party cannot be harmless).
169. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967); see also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (error in admitting relevant evidence that contributes to
the conviction cannot be harmless). In Chapman, the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the defendant's refusal to testify, a right guaranteed to the defendant by the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 25-26. This prosecutorial tactic was prohibited by an earlier Court decision, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
which held invalid state constitutional provisions permitting adverse inferences to be
drawn from a defendant's failure to testify. See id. at 615.
170. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("the burden [is] on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his
erroneously obtained judgment").
171. Id. at 23 & n.8 (citing as examples, a defendant's rights to be free from coerced
confessions, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958); to have the assistance of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); and to be tried by an impartial
judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)).
172. Justice Stewart advocated a rule of automatic reversal to discourage prosecutors
from "indulging in clear violations of Griffin," see supra note 169, in the future. See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). If the prosecution chose to ignore such clear Court proscriptions, Justice Stewart saw "no reason why
the sanction of reversal should not be the result." Id.
Justice Harlan stated that limitations on harmless error rules stem from two types of
error that cannot be permitted in a fair trial. The first are those that have a devastating
effect on the defendant, such as the admission of coerced confessions or the denial of the
right to counsel, which can never be harmless because of their unfair impact on the ac-
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also the original thrust of the Supreme Court's use of the confrontation
clause.173 If such violations of a defendant's confrontation rights carried
the automatic reversal penalty, prosecutors would be less likely to try to
with unnecessary and prejudicial coconspirator hearbolster their cases
74
say evidence.'
Harmless error is often really not "harmless" when viewed in terms of
an overall fair trial. "[H]armless error rules can work very unfair and
mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive
evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial

in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one.'

l7

This kind

of subversive prejudice to the defendant, which coconspirator statements
are particularly likely to evoke,' 76 should not be permitted when the evicused. Id. at 51-52 & n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Automatic reversal can also serve to
discourage a second type of error-prosecutorial or official misconduct; such a sanction
for "official misbehavior [is necessary] because society cannot tolerate giving final effect to
a judgment tainted with . . . intentional misconduct." Id. at 52 n.7.
173. Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note. The advisory committee draws
this conclusion from an examination of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which
might as easily have been decided "under [the] conventional hearsay doctrine read in the
light of a constitutional right to counsel," Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee
note, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), in which exclusion of the codefendant's confession on hearsay grounds was possible but would not have accomplished the
opinion's "real thrust. . . in the direction of curbing undesirable prosecutorial behavior,
rather than merely applying rules of exclusion . . . [T]he confrontation clause was the
means selected to achieve this end." Fed. R. Evid. art VIII advisory committee note.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), also pointed to the use of the confrontation clause
to prevent misuse of confessions or prosecutorial misconduct or negligence. See id. at 87;
see also Confrontation, supra note 4, at 1439 (confrontation clause should be read as a
"canon of prosecutorial behavior," requiring the prosecution to produce available declarants and refrain from the temptation "to use hearsay instead of live witnesses whose
demeanor is unimpressive").
174. The adoption of an automatic reversal penalty, at least for the misuse of coconspirator admissions that violate a defendant's confrontation rights, can be justified on
both a general and a specific level. First, a general sanction against the intentional violations of a defendant's constitutional rights should be available in any case involving
prosecutorial misconduct, regardless of its impact on the outcome. This rationale is nothing more than the fair trial guarantee supported by deterrent measures to protect defendants from overzealous prosecutors. It attaches equally to all constitutional protections.
On a specific level, however, violation of a defendant's confrontation guarantee with
coconspirator admissions may support an automatic reversal penalty regardless of any
flagrant prosecutorial misconduct. Coconspirator admissions can be conceived of as a
species of involuntary confession when the declarant is identified with the defendant for
purposes of admitting the statement. Like involuntary confessions, which are extremely
prejudicial, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958), coconspirator statements have a
"profound impact on the jury," Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 140 (1968)
(White, J., dissenting) (case involving codefendants), at least when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant is unable to expose the defects in the admission. An automatic reversal sanction, like that for involuntary confessions, see Payne, 356 U.S. at 568,
would prevent the continued use of inherently unreliable coconspirator admissions attributed to the defendant, thereby preserving the defendant's confrontation and due process
guarantees.
175. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
176. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court commented on "the
powerfully incriminating [effect of] extrajudicial statements of a codefendant who stands
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dence is unreliable and conceivably unnecessary to a conviction.'" If
trial courts do not begin to exclude questionable hearsay on their own,
appellate courts must send the message that such exclusion is required.
This message will not be communicated if the higher courts continue to
excuse admission of coconspirator hearsay as harmless.
2.

The Waiver Excuse

Courts have sometimes excused the violation of a defendant's right of
accused side-by-side with the defendant," id. at 135-36, finding these incriminations "devastating to the defendant" and their credibility "inevitably suspect." Id. at 136. Justice
Stewart later inverted this warning when writing for the plurality of the Court in Dutton,
holding that statements that are neither "crucial" nor "devastating" may be admitted
without violating a defendant's confrontation rights. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
87 (1970).
In his dissent in Dutton, Justice Marshall also found that an "incriminatory extrajudicial statement of an alleged accomplice is so inherently prejudicial that it cannot be introduced unless there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, whether or not his
statement falls within a genuine exception to the hearsay rule." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 11011 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Coconspirators, even if unindicted, cast a similar pall of
prejudicial suspicion upon the defendant with their statements, if not because of the actual content of the statement, then because of the derivative prejudice which always accompanies a charge of conspiracy.
The Supreme Court has held that evidence of any uncharged crime is inherently prejudicial. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). Thus, in cases in
which no conspiracy is charged, there can be no doubt of the inherent prejudice. Even if
a conspiracy is charged, however, coconspirator admissions are often prejudicial. See
United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.25 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1982),
affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 1423 (1984); see also United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 796 (9th
Cir. 1984) (the court "reverse[d] the conspiracy charge because of the prejudicial impact
of the inadmissible ledger entries [admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)] on the jury's fact
finding function"); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 257 (3d Cir.) ("admission of
coconspirator statements in a complex conspiracy trial with multiple defendants must be
carefully monitored. . . to avoid undue prejudice to the defendants"), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1331 (10th Cir. 1979) (there
is a need to prevent the "inherent danger of prejudice to a defendant which would result
should a jury consider hearsay statements that lack adequate guarantees of trustworthiness"-as coconspirator statements usually do), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); Uncharged Conspiracies,supra note 36, at 949 (coconspirator statements are inherently
prejudicial).
On a common sense level, coconspirator statements are inherently prejudicial because
they evoke guilt by association. In this regard, the criminal agency theory is more fact
than fiction.
177. Even if the evidence does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant in some
cases, it is at the very least constitutionally inelegant to allow the admission of evidence
that will often later meet the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Defendants
"are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967). "The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be
done.'" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). While this argument may be based
more on aesthetics than on substantial rights, there is something slightly profane about
invading a constitutional right and then finding the error harmless. Although procedural rules are expedient and necessary, it seems unfortunate that they ever need to be
used as a means of skirting fundamental guarantees.
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confrontation by finding that the defendant has impliedly or expressly
waived that right.178 A waiver of a constitutional right is "an intentional
relinquishment. . . of a known right or privilege."' 7 9 Whether a waiver
is made with adequate intent depends on the facts of each case and the
accused's knowledge of his act's consequences. 80
A waiver of the confrontation right has been implied in a variety of
ways, so long as the record contained evidence that the conduct or action
resulting in a waiver was undertaken with knowledge of its potential
effects.' 8 ' Misconduct during the trial may constitute a waiver of the
confrontation right,' 82 although8 the
right can be reclaimed when the de3
fendant agrees to act properly.
Confrontation rights have been waived more directly by a guilty plea,
when the record indicates that the plea was entered voluntarily and with
knowledge of its consequences.' 8 4 A silent record will not support an
implied waiver." 5 The confrontation right has also been waived when
the defendant voluntarily was absent from his trial, 8 6 when he stipulated
to evidence offered by the prosecution, 87 and when the unavailability of
the witnesses has been caused by the unlawful interference of the defendant or his agents.' 88 Finally, one circuit avoided the confrontation issue,
178. See infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
179. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
180. Id.
181. If a defendant contests the validity of an allegedly competent and intelligent
waiver, he must prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 468-69. Once
it is established that the right had not been waived, it then becomes the duty of the
reviewing court to grant a defendant's habeas corpus petition to annul the proceeding.
See id.

182. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
183. Id. Even in the absence of the defendant, however, counsel may be permitted to
continue to represent and protect his interests. See id. at 351 (recommending that after a
contumacious defendant is removed from the proceeding, the court should use reasonable
efforts to allow the defendant to communicate with his attorney and keep abreast of the
proceeding) (Brennan, J., concurring). But cf United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1358 n. 11 (8th Cir. 1976) (counsel may continue to represent a defendant's interest when
the defendant is voluntarily absent from trial or removed due to misconduct, but not
when the waiver occurred through the defendant causing the witness unavailability
through intimidation or misconduct), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
184. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
185. Id. at 242-43 & n.5 (record must contain an affirmative showing that the waiver
was voluntary and intelligent: "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is
impermissible").
186. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1973).
187. See United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 948 (1974). But cf Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1971) (adequate
waiver of a hearsay objection does not constitute a valid waiver of a defendant's confrontation right), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).
188. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant's
intimidation of a witness to prevent his testifying is a waiver of the confrontation right:
"[t]he Sixth Amendment does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from his own
misconduct or chicanery"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Graham, supra note 2, at
139 (a defendant cannot prevent the use of a witness' hearsay testimony on confrontation
grounds if the defendant has murdered the witness).
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and therefore the reliability inquiry, by finding that the defendant waived
his confrontation right by failing to make a timely objection to the introduction of the evidence.18 9 Although preservation of constitutional
rights often takes a back seat to a state's interest in finality,'" 0 this interest and other forms of administrative inconvenience should not outweigh
a defendant's confrontation guarantee. Appellate courts should therefore
review claimed abridgements of confrontation rights under the plain error doctrine, regardless of whether the issue was raised at trial.',91
In any trial where the defendant has waived his constitutional right,
189. See United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 840 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc), cerl
denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985). In Gibbs, the defendant objected to the introduction of
coconspirator double hearsay at the close of the prosecution's evidence, id. at 848, but
only in general terms of a "clear Sixth Amendment problem," id., and not on the specific
ground that the prosecution had failed to carry its burden of showing the declarant to be
unavailable. The court viewed this nonspecific objection as having the effect of depriving
the prosecution of the opportunity to produce the declarant or to demonstrate his unavailability. See id. at 849. Construing the Roberts burden of demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant, see 448 U.S. at 65, in this way imposes a burden on the defendant
to lodge a timely and specific confrontation objection before the prosecution's duty to
produce the declarant or demonstrate his unavailability arises. Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 849.
The prosecution's duty to produce the declarant or demonstrate unavailability, however,
was not so conditionally imposed in Roberts. See 448 U.S. at 65. On the basis of this
finding of untimely objection, see Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 849, and no plain error, see id. at 850
& n.25, the court declined to review Gibbs' sixth amendment objection, see id. at 850.
The dissent exposed the problems caused by avoiding the confrontation issue in this
case. First, the "crux of the Government's case depend[ed] upon the out-of-court statements," id. at 851 (Rosenn, J., dissenting), which sounds very much like the sort of "crucial" evidence that Dutton arguably would require to be cross-examined to assure the
defendant's confrontation right was respected, see infra note 210. Also, the testimony
was more than merely crucial, more than "the core of the Government's case." Gibbs,
739 F.2d at 854. The dissent classifies the case against Gibbs as resting "largely on
untested, devastating hearsay." Id. at 857 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In Gibbs, there is
more than the Dutton threat of crucial or devastating hearsay-there is both. The need
and permissibility for review becomes clear in such cases of plain error, regardless of the
timeliness, or even the complete absence, of appropriate objection.
190. For example, if the defendant has gone through the entire appellate process on
direct review and petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, great deference
should be given to the state procedural rules barring the adjudication of any issues not
raised at trial, because collateral attacks on convictions undermine the finality of the
judgment. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164-66 (1982) (Court imposing
stricter prejudice requirements for adjudicating procedurally defaulted constitutional
claims on habeas review than are imposed on direct appeal); Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 444-53 (1963)
(noting the great finality interest in convictions once the appellate process or direct review is completed); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-51 (1970) (same).
191. Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide for sua sponte review of plain errors affecting a defendant's substantial rights.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."); Fed. R. Evid.
103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."); see also United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) ("[E]specially in criminal cases, appellate
courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no excep-
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objections should nevertheless be permitted against the admission of
coconspirator hearsay when it is clearly unreliable. The waiver of any or
all of the criminal defendant's protections, in any form short of a guilty
plea waiving the right to trial altogether, should not waive the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. A waiver may mean that no rights
of the accused are being infringed, but it cannot answer the need to supply the trier of fact with reliable evidence.1 92 Accordingly, although a
defendant's confrontation rights would not be at issue after the waiverespecially in cases in which the defendant's own misconduct has caused
the absence of the declarant 193-this excuse should not be used as a
tion has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.").
Because the Supreme Court has determined that unavailability and reliability must be
demonstrated in order to satisfy confrontation principles before introduction of hearsay
evidence, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980), a silent record on the issues of
availability and reliability must raise a presumption of error; the burden of addressing
these issues is on the party seeking to admit the hearsay, see id. at 65, and should not be
satisfied by defendant's failure to make a timely objection to the invasion of his substantial rights, see United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 857 (3d Cir. 1984) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 779 (1985).
Roberts does not condone silent records on the subject of admissibility of hearsay. To
satisfy the Roberts requirement, an offer of hearsay must be accompanied by one or more
of the following: 1) the testifying declarant, in which case confrontation requires nothing
further; 2) a showing of the prosecution's good faith efforts to produce the declarant, see
supra note 89 and accompanying text; 3) if no efforts could produce the declarant, a
convincing statement of the reason why production is impossible, see supra note 92 and
accompanying text, or would be of remote utility to the defendant, see supra note 94 and
accompanying text; 4) a showing of the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of
the profferred hearsay, see supra note 110 and accompanying text. If a trial record does
not contain this information, and the hearsay is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the protections of Roberts have not been satisfied, and remand should ensue. United
States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980).
Some courts have recognized the fair trial requirement. See, e.g., United States v.
Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1984) (although no confrontation objection was
raised at trial, court reviewed the confrontation issue because it "involve[d] substantial
rights which must be reviewed even in the absence of a timely objection"); United States
v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1983) (court reviewed, under the plain error
doctrine, the unpreserved issue whether admission of coconspirator hearsay was crucial
or devastating), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1602 (1984); United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d
1326, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) (unpreserved confrontation issue reviewed under the plain
error doctrine); United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980) (court
finding that confrontation clause is violated when record is silent regarding availability
and reliability); cf United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1978) (court
will review unpreserved confrontation issue when the prosecution fails to challenge a
defendant's right to raise the issue), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979); Phillips v. Neil,
452 F.2d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1971) (proper admission of hearsay under evidentiary rules
does not relieve a federal court from reviewing all facts relating to governing constitutional principles), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).
192. Because of the requirement that convictions be based only on reliable evidence,
see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968), it is doubtful whether due
process rights to reliable evidence can ever be waived. Thus, a defendant should be able
to object to unreliable coconspirator admissions on due process grounds even after a
waiver of his confrontation right. See supra note 113.
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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means to permit wholly unreliable coconspirator hearsay to be considered as evidence against the accused.
III.

CLOSING THE WIDE-FLUNG WINDOW OF ADMISSIBILITY FOR
COCONSPIRATOR ADMISSIONS

Despite the Supreme Court's narrow rulings on when admission of
hearsay will not abridge the defendant's right of confrontation, 194 courts
have consistently admitted coconspirator hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2)(E).' 95 Most of the courts have not paid sufficient attention to
the Roberts requirement that the declarant be unavailable before the
statement is admitted,' 96 often failing even to address the issue of the
declarant's availability.'97 Furthermore, although courts that look for
particularized guarantees of reliability'9 8 are taking the better approach,
their basic error with regard to coconspirator admissions is their unwavering success in finding that the Roberts criteria are satisfied.' 99 Roberts
provides useful and reasonable guidance for the admission of hearsay
when the declarant is not produced at trial, but that guidance is premised
on a search for reliability,2° and, try as they may, courts are not convincing in their attempts to infuse reliability into admissions of unproduced coconspirators."0 1
Ironically, these courts, in recognition of how unreliable coconspirator
statements can be, are adding a requirement not contained in Rule
801(d)(2)(E): They require that the prosecution show some independent
evidence of the conspiracy before the coconspirator hearsay can be
presented to the trier of fact.20 2 Although such independent evidence
may be useful in determining whether a conspiracy exists, it does little to
194. See supra notes 18, 55, 111-12 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 122-23, 154, 166, 181-90 and accompanying text.
196. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
197. See supra notes 123, 158 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Pt. II.
199. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 18, 55, 95, 111-12 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
202. Independent evidence of the declarant's and defendant's participation in the conspiracy will usually be required before the coconspirator hearsay is admitted. See Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942). Five circuits require the independent evidence
to reach a clear or fair preponderance level-a "more probable than not" standardbefore the hearsay is admitted. See, e.g., United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 246 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965
(10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ziegler, 583 F.2d 77, 81 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Enright, 579
F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
Four circuits have recently adopted a higher standard of proof, however, requiring
"substantial independent evidence" before admitting the coconspirator admission. See,
e.g., United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1010 (1982); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 905 (1981); United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
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ensure the reliability of the coconspirator's statement implicating the defendant in the conspiracy.2 °3

The proper analysis for determining the admissibility of coconspirator
hearsay should vary, depending on whether the declarant is truly un-

available or whether he is available but not produced. When the declarant is available but not produced, the coconspirator hearsay should be

excluded because the necessity of admitting the hearsay will almost never
outweigh the statement's unreliability. This is apparent because coconspirator hearsay is neither firmly rooted in the reliability sense of that
term, 2 °4 nor can it, in the vast majority of cases, contain the kinds of
trustworthiness guarantees envisioned by the Roberts Court in its alternative to firmly rooted exceptions.20 5
A bright line rule requiring the declarant's production is needed to
curb prosecutors' demonstrated weakness for introducing coconspirator
hearsay, 206 even though there may be a few cases in which coconspirator
statements are reliable enough to be admitted under the confrontation
clause if an available witness is not produced. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides sufficient protection when the coconspirator declarant is available
and produced for cross-examination at trial, but without this guarantee
of trustworthiness, no policy or rationale underlying the exception is a
449 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1979).
Bootstrapping the evidence into competency occurs when the trial judge permits the
evidence to be admitted contingent upon the subsequent satisfaction of the independent
evidence requirement. See Davenport, supra note 8, at 1388-89. If the prosecution fails
to meet this burden, the judge must either instruct the jury to disregard the admission,
id., or declare a mistrial, Martin, Two ProposedRules of Evidence Discussed, 188 N.Y.L.J.
70, Oct. 8, 1982, at 2, col. 5. One court has even held that the judge may consider the
hearsay statement itself in determining the preliminary question of admissibility. See
United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074
(1980). The better practice, however, is when courts delay the admission of hearsay until
after the independent proof burden has been satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Trowery,
542 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); James, 590 F.2d at
581-82.
203. United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980).
204. See supra Pt. I.B.2.a.
205. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). See supra notes 113, 125-29 and accompanying text.
206. Bright line rules are often justified as a means of providing clear guidance and
predictable results in areas in which alternative results are so rarely appropriate that it is
preferable to have one rule for all situations than to leave the field open to potential
abuse. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (although
there may be isolated instances when horizontal price-fixing in restraint of trade may not
be unreasonable and thus in violation of the Sherman Act, a per se rule of illegality is
needed to assure predictability, act as a deterrent to price-fixing and save judicial costs).
Coconspirator admissions pose a similar need for such guidance. Coconspirator statements will be sufficiently reliable in so few cases that justice would be better served by
excluding those few statements when the declarant is available but unproduced, rather
than by allowing courts to continue to admit unreliable hearsay that infringes upon the
defendant's confrontation guarantee.
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sufficient guarantee of the reliability of the evidence.2"" This clear rule of
exclusion would also provide the prosecution with a predictable basis for
determining what evidence can be offered against a defendant.2 08
In cases in which the declarant is truly unavailable, such as when he is
deceased,20 9 the necessity of admitting the declarant's statement into evidence becomes a more important factor in determining whether or not to
admit the out-of-court statement. Accordingly, with sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy, those rare coconspirator statements that are
reliable should be admitted if the declarant is unavailable. Even in the
unusual case of a deceased declarant and a somewhat reliable coconspirator statement, however, the evidence should not be admitted if it is
crucial to the prosecutor's case or devastatingly prejudicial to the defendant. Convictions based predominantly on hearsay testimony should be
eschewed because, at the very least, the confrontation clause ensures that
a defendant's conviction will not be wholly based on evidence that has
not been confronted. Dutton's crucial or devastating inquiry should
therefore represent an outer boundary, barring the prosecutor from using
statements of unavailable declarants that are crucial to its case or that
have a devastatingly prejudicial effect on the defendant.2"'
207. See supra notes 36, 44, 126-29 and accompanying text. Of course, if the statement
does meet the requirements of another hearsay exception, such as the former testimony or
business records exception, it has satisfied the confrontation reliability requirement apart
from its status as a coconspirator admission and can be admitted if the declarant is sufficiently unavailable. Such admission is proper because the requirements for admission
under such exceptions, unlike the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E),
guarantee reliability. See supra notes 14, 24-26 and accompanying text.
208. The rule of exclusion would also contribute to the state's interest in finality of its
convictions, see supra note 190 and accompanying text, by curtailing the need for prolonged appeals, at least on the confrontation ground. Such finality is also in the defendant's interest because his sixth amendment guarantee to a speedy trial must include a
reasonably speedy conclusion to the proceedings and should not be frustrated by the need
to appeal convictions based on questionable evidence.
209. Because of the potential for abuse in other forms of unavailability, the prosecution
should only be excused from its duty to produce coconspirator declarants when they are
deceased, verifiably incompetent or impossible to locate. Unavailability due to declaration of a privilege, refusal to testify, claimed loss of memory or absence from the jurisdiction should not suffice to excuse the prosecutor from producing the declarant. All of
these forms of unavailability can be cured in some manner or other. Because of the
special need for the tests of cross-examination when offering coconspirator admissions,
the prosecution's need to introduce the evidence should be limited to occasions when
necessity cannot be questioned and the form of the declarant's unavailability does not
tend to influence the weight the jury gives to the out-of-court statement, see supra note
90. Even in cases in which unavailability is unquestionable, however, the statements cannot be admitted when they are crucial or devastating.
210. By permitting the introduction of coconspirator hearsay because it was neither
"crucial" nor "devastating," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970), Dutton arguably
establishes a bar to hearsay evidence that is crucial to the prosecution's case or devastating to the defendant. See United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d 1357, 1368 n.12 (9th Cir.
1980) ("Dutton may require exclusion of 'devastating' or 'crucial' evidence even if indicia
of reliability are present.").
The "crucial" or "devastating" inquiry derives from a number of earlier Supreme
Court cases finding that the prosecution cannot use crucial or devastating testimony
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against the defendant when the declarant is not produced. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at
87 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 41820 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-08 (1965)); see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 720, 725-26 (1968) (introduction of "principal evidence" against the accused in the
form of a preliminary hearing transcript violates the defendant's right of confrontation);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965) (admission of a declarant's alleged
statement without cross-examination violated defendant's confrontation right as it was a
"crucial" link to the proof of defendant's crime); id. at 420 (prohibiting the use of hearsay
that adds "'critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination'" because it "'unfairly prejudice[s] the defendant' ") (quoting Namet v. United
States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963)); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401, 408 (1965) (prohibiting the "principal evidence" against the accused to be in the form of a preliminary
hearing transcript when the defendant was unable adequately to confront the witness due
to his lack of counsel); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1974) (post-Dutton
case holding that a defendant's confrontation right is denied when impeachment of a
"crucial" witness' testimony is curtailed); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 & n.10
(1970) (referring to the Raleigh trial, see supra note 2, and the "crucial" evidence
presented in the form of hearsay, in a context implying the constitutional inadequacy of
evidence that has not been cross-examined); id. at 162 (noting that the Court in Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), found a confrontation violation in the admission of an
unconfronted "crucial" witness' testimony); Green, 399 U.S. at 186 n.20 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that convictions should be reversed whenever "the critical issues" were
only supported by ex parte testimony not found reliable by the trier of fact and not crossexamined); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968) (holding that a hearsay
confession violates confrontation rights when it adds "critical weight" to the prosecution's case); id. at 136 (codefendant's confession was "devastating" to the defendant and
therefore must be cross-examined); id. at 137-38 (Stewart, J., concurring) (confrontation
clause precludes the use of "highly damaging" extra-judicial statements by codefendants
that have not been cross-examined). When mentioning that the statement was neither
"crucial" nor "devastating" to the defendant in Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87, the plurality
contrasted the facts of the case with several of the above cases and found the statement in
Dutton fully distinguishable, see id.
Two circuit courts have stated that hearsay testimony should be excluded if it is crucial
and the defendant has not been able adequately to cross-examine the declarant. See Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1984) (conviction reversed due to
improper curtailment of defendant's cross-examination of a "crucial" prosecution witness); United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1982) (conviction reversed
due to curtailment of cross-examination of a "crucial" witness for the prosecution).
Other courts have implied that they might have excluded the testimony if it had been
crucial or devastating. See, e.g., United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (coconspirator statements not "crucial" to the prosecution's case, so
held to be admissible); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (indicia of
reliability may permit the introduction of hearsay that the defendant cannot cross-examine when the statement is neither "crucial" nor "devastating"), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
917 (1979); United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 621 (8th Cir. 1975) (statement,
"although damaging, was not crucial or devastating," so held to be admissible), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976); see also Davenport, supra note 8, at 1380 & n.11
("[W]herever such ["crucial" or "devastating"] evidence is involved, a reliability analysis
will be deemed an inadequate substitute for cross-examination.") (citing The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 196-98 (1971)); Davenport, supra note 8, at 1400
("[Alt least one absolute proposition seems clear: a declaration should be excluded whenever its sincerity is not assured and its hearsay impact is likely to be 'crucial' or 'devastating'.").
At least one commentator reads the In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), requirement
that evidence support every element of a conviction "beyond a reasonable doubt," id. at
361, as a prohibition of convictions based solely on uncross-examined hearsay testimony.
See Westen, supra note 68, at 1194 & n.40. This analysis is consistent with the "crucial"
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Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,2 1 considered with this
proposed upper limit, should exclude coconspirator statements in many
situations. Coconspirator hearsay is often prejudicial to the defendant, if
for no other reason than the moral theory that coconspirators, because of
the concert of action element, are somehow more culpable than other
criminal defendants.2 12 As argued, coconspirator hearsay at least should
be necessary enough to the prosecution's case to preclude it from being
found harmless on appeal. 23 If not, its probative value will sometimes
be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, thereby requiring exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403
when the declarant is unavailable.2" 4 At the other extreme, evidence
with a high probative value will often be excluded by application of the
proposed prohibition against crucial or devastating hearsay when the declarant is unavailable.2 15 Other forms of hearsay might have a consideralimitation on coconspirator hearsay when the declarant is unavailable: For hearsay that
adds critical weight to the prosecution's case, the declarant must be cross-examined to
satisfy all reasonable doubts and the confrontation guarantee. Only when hearsay is not
"crucial" or "devastating" may full confrontation be excused without violating a defendant's constitutional guarantees.
211. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." This balancing of probative value and
prejudice has been referred to as "the cornerstone" of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see
22 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5212, at 250 n.l, and
the rule is applicable to all "situations for which no specific rules have been formulated,"
Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note. For examples of rules to which Rule 403
would not apply, see Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (specific balancing prescribed for admission

of felony convictions as impeachment evidence; probative value need merely outweigh
prejudicial effect); Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (specific balancing prescribed for admission of old
convictions as impeachment evidence; probative value must substantially outweigh preju-

dicial effect).
212. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 175-77 and accompanying text.
214. Prosecutors who find evidence that is probative but has little value because of the
availability of other evidence should not be permitted to use such evidence unless a witness is available.
For the purpose of this analysis, it may be helpful to assess coconspirator statement
factors on a numerical scale. Probative value will be the variable, ranging from 0 to 70
for harmless error (presuming the better standard of substantial independent evidence of
the conspiracy, see supra note 202), 71 to 80 for reliable evidence that is neither harmless,
crucial nor devastating, and 81 to 100 for inadmissible crucial evidence. The danger of
unfair prejudice is set at a constant of 90--with a recognition that although some small
variations are possible, prejudice generally will remain high. See supra note 176.
In this hypothetical, because a coconspirator's hearsay is not necessary enough to
preclude it from being found harmless on appeal, its probative value is 70 or less and
prejudice is 90; exclusion under Rule 403 therefore should result because prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.
215. Although Rule 403 might permit the introduction of evidence with a probative
value rating over 80 and a prejudice rating of 90 on the numerical scale, see supra note
214-prejudice not substantially outweighing probative value-the proposed upper
boundary would not permit admission if the crucial or devastating language in Dutton is
read as the upper limit on admissibility.
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ble range of admissibility between the lower threshold of limited
probative value and the upper threshold of probative but devastating
hearsay.2 16 Because of the high level of prejudice that coconspirator
hearsay often elicits, 2 17 however, whether through the content of the
statement or derivatively from the nature of the charge, and because of
the low level of reliability inherent in the nature of the statements, coconspirator hearsay by unavailable declarants does not share with other
hearsay evidence this support for admissibility. Coconspirator hearsay
by unavailable declarants would be admissible only in the few situations
in which there is sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy, coupled with probative and reliable evidence that is not crucial2to
the prose18
cution's case or devastatingly prejudicial to the defendant.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the advisory
committee considered the possibility of abolishing the rule against hearsay evidence, but abandoned the notion because of the continuing need
for reliability, for which the exceptions to the hearsay rule provide.2 19 In
its commentary, the committee noted that adopting such a position
would require that the confrontation clause enter into an area presently
monitored in criminal cases by the rule against hearsay 220 to prevent admission of unreliable evidence against criminal defendants. By removing
the coconspirator exception from its common law status as a hearsay
exception and placing it among the nonhearsay admissions in Rule
801(d)(2), the Federal Rules arguably accomplished a partial abolition of
the rule against hearsay in this narrow area. Because coconspirator
statements are the only form of "not hearsay" that creates tension with
the confrontation clause, 221 and because Rule 801(d)(2)(E), unlike the
"hearsay exceptions," does not use reliability as its basis of admissibility, 222 this Rule is in the greatest need of the injection of the confronta216. For example, the numerical scale, see supra note 214, for business records would
be very different than for coconspirator statements. Because the exception is trustworthy,
minimal probative value might be 50 or lower. Moreover, prejudice might not appear on
the scale at all in many instances, because business records are not inherently prejudicial.
Even leaving the crucial boundary at 80, more business record hearsay than coconspirator admissions would be admissible under Rule 403 and Dutton. The key differences
are the hearsay's reliability and potential for prejudice.
217. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
218. On the numerical scale, see supra note 214, this would be the evidence remaining
in the 71-80 probative value range. A 90 prejudice factor would still substantially outweigh most, if not all, of the probative value of coconspirator admissions. Nevertheless,
as the probative value approaches the crucial border, a Rule 403 weighing may permit its
admission. It would arguably have to be knocking at the "crucial" door, however, before
its probative value is sufficient.
219. See Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee note.
220. See id.
221. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. Other forms of "not hearsay,"
such as prior inconsistent statements, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), or prior identifications,
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), already have an availability requirement built in, and therefore create no tension with the confrontation clause.
222. See supra notes 14, 23-43 and accompanying text.
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tion clause to provide guarantees of reliability. Excluding all
coconspirator hearsay when the available coconspirator is unproduced,
and prohibiting the introduction of crucial or devastating evidence even
when the declarant is truly unavailable,1 3 would admirably serve that
purpose, consistent with the need for the protection of confrontation
clause guarantees in the absence of procedural rules based on
trustworthiness.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) would then be simple to apply. Prosecutors could
still introduce hearsay evidence against alleged coconspirators when the
declarant is available for cross-examination at trial, or when the declarant is unavailable and the hearsay, supported by adequate independent
assurances of reliability, is not crucial or devastating. If the declarant is
available but refuses to testify due to a declaration of privilege, a prosecutor could weigh the need for the coconspirator's evidence against the cost
of some form of immunity. 4 In cases in which the proposed, stringent
rules would bar admissibility of the hearsay altogether, the prosecution
could still use the coconspirator's statements as the basis for a search for
reliable independent evidence against the accused. The loss to conspiracy prosecutions would therefore not be overwhelming. 2
The gain to the defendant and the integrity of the criminal justice system, however, would be immense. A fundamental guarantee of life and
liberty would be preserved and simultaneously the factfinder's search for
truth would be aided by admission of reliable evidence. 2 6 At least in an
area in which the rule against hearsay has forsaken the field, the confrontation clause can assume a predictable and efficient role in furthering the
223. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) permits the admission of statements by witnesses about
the declarant's prior inconsistent, consistent, or identification statement when the declarant is available for cross-examination.
224. The decision to confer immunity is usually within the complete discretion of the
prosecutor, who would be in the best position to determine whether the declarant's evidence was important enough to pay that price. In United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979), the defendant claimed that the prosecution's refusal to grant immunity to the "most critical witness" against him, see id. at 35,
violated his compulsory process right, id. at 37, and implied an additional confrontation
problem, id. Unfortunately, this interesting question was not resolved because the court
did not consider the witness to be crucial, id. at 35, and the defendant failed to exercise
his compulsory process rights to subpoena the witness anyway, id. at 37.
225. If the coconspirator statement were really that reliable, as shown by independent
guarantees of trustworthiness, see supra note 202, the prosecution could offer it under the
residual hearsay exceptions, Rules 803(24) or 804(b)(5), when the declarant is shown to
be unavailable. This rule offers a clear standard to assure trustworthiness of statements
made by unavailable declarants and would probably entail a more careful review of availability and reliability than is the current practice in admitting coconspirator statements
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). One circuit has indicated that Rule 803(24) may provide the
reliability standard for coconspirator admissions. See United States v. Fielding, 630 F.2d
1357, 1369 n.13 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.
1979).
226. Exclusion of coconspirator admissions would also encourage the gathering of reliable evidence on which to base conspiracy convictions, thereby responding to the judicial
system's concern that only trustworthy evidence come before the trier of fact.
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ideal of swift2 27and certain justice.
CONCLUSION

In the small comer of the hearsay world dealing with coconspirator
statements, the confrontation clause has a special vitality that cannot be
disregarded. Some minimum level of reliability must exist before coconspirator statements should be permitted to come before a jury. Every
defendant-including an alleged coconspirator-is entitled to a verdict
based on reliable evidence, and if the evidence cannot be reliable when
the declarant is not produced, the defendant must receive the protection
through the guarantees of the confrontation clause.
In order to comport with the confrontation clause, Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
should be applied in a more limited context, with a requirement for actual confrontation with the declarant, with minor exceptions, so that the
defendant can be protected from the dangers of unreliable coconspirator
hearsay. The confrontation clause does not require such literal confrontation for the admission of every species of hearsay because many other
forms of hearsay are sufficiently reliable despite the unavailability of the
declarant. Coconspirator statements, however, almost never provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness apart from producing the declarant
and testing the veracity of his statement. Accordingly, a rule of exclusion when the declarant is available but unproduced, with a limited exception when the declarant is unavailable and the evidence is not crucial
to the prosecution's case or devastatingly prejudicial to the defendant, is
necessary to prevent the courts from continuing to find illusory indicia of
reliability in the statements. The confrontation clause was designed to
protect a criminal defendant from just this kind of hearsay, and, because
of the absence of any fair substitute for reliability, its requirements must
be met in most cases by producing the coconspirator declarant.
Georgia J. Hinde
227. See supra note 208.

